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MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES: DOES
PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION
POSITIVELY AFFECT MANAGERIAL
PERFORMANCE?
Susan J. Stabilet
There is a time to admire the grace and persuasive power of an
influential idea, and there is a time to fear its hold over us. The
time to worry is when the idea is so widely shared that we no
longer even notice it, when it is so deeply rooted that it feels to us
like plain common sense. At the point when objections are not
answered anymore because they are no longer even raised, we are
not in control: we do not have the idea; it has us.'
The outcry over high levels of executive compensation, especially in
companies whose shareholders are not faring well, has led to a movement
towards increased use of various types of performance-based
compensation. Corporate boards of directors2 increasingly provide
compensation packages under which a greater portion of an executive's pay
takes the form of contingent compensation arrangements, rather than a
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1. ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE
PLANS, A's, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES 3 (1993). Kohn observes that "the use of rewards
has come to seem so natural and inevitable that merely to pose the question, Why are we
doing this? can strike us as perplexing - and also, perhaps, a little unsettling." Id. at 13-14.
2. Boards of directors have the responsibility of setting executive compensation. This
power comes by virtue of the board's authority to manage the business affairs of the
corporation. See, e.g., CAL. GEN. CORP. L. § 300 (West 1990); DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(a)
(West 1991). Directors also have the authority to fix their own compensation as directors.
See, e.g., CAL. GEN. CORP. L. § 310 (a)(3) (West 1990); DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(h) (West
1991). Although director compensation is also a topic of current discussion, it is beyond the
scope of this article.
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guaranteed base salary.3 Contingent compensation, at least theoretically,
introduces an element of risk for the executive. Where an executive
receives all or almost all of her salary in the form of a fixed-base salary,
she gets that pay regardless of how she or the company performs. Where a
significant portion of pay takes the form of performance-based
compensation, such as annual bonus plans, stock options, or stock bonus
arrangements, that portion of the executive's compensation is at risk-
dependant upon company and/or individual performance.
4
The movement toward contingent compensation is not difficult to
understand. Obviously, it raises eyebrows if corporate executives are paid
3. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 89 (1995) ("In a widespread effort to tie
executive pay more strongly to long-term stock price performance, corporations in the
1980s increased their use of compensation schemes that include 'stock options."'); Adam
Bryant, Flying High on the Option Express, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 3, at 8 (suggesting
that large option grants became common as a result of demands from activist shareholders
that compensation be linked to performance); see also Linda J. Barns, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND.
L.J. 59, 80 (1992) (quoting the executive director of United Shareholders Association
stating that performance-based compensation is the only acceptable solution to excessive
executive compensation and other remedies are "wrong-headed"); Andrew R. Brownstein &
Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV.
Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 31 (citing a report that more than 80% of the largest U.S.
companies now use stock compensation to link long-term performance of a company to
executive salaries).
Although having a significant portion of an executive's pay take the form of
contingent compensation is a relatively recent phenomenon, pay for performance is not a
new idea. Some say that the philosophy of linking pay to performance dates back to the
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See ROBERT L.
HENEMAN, MERIT PAY: LINKING PAY INCREASES TO PERFORMANCE RATINGS 7 (1992).
Others date the philosophy back even further. 'The practice of rewarding those who
perform well dates back to the very early times when kings allowed their nobles and chiefs
to keep the spoils of the battles they won. Shortly before the birth of Christ, Julius Caesar is
said to have instituted a more elaborate system to supply bonuses to loyal soldiers
participating in successful campaigns - 50 dinari for every legionnaire and 500 for each
centurion." DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 39 (1993); see also Christopher Lowery et
al., Assessing the Merit of Merit Pay, HUM. RESOURCES PLAN., Mar. 1, 1996, at 26 (citing
Locke, "the use of money as a means of motivation probably traces back to the origins of
money itself"). The use of performance-based compensation for American executives dates
back to the World War I era, when executives began to receive bonuses as a significant part
of their compensation. See Bok, supra, at 39-40.
Various terms are used to describe these forms of compensation, including contingent
compensation, performance-based compensation and incentive compensation. Those terms
are used interchangeably in this article.
4. Some would argue that despite the increased use of performance-based
compensation, there is no real risk. See, e.g., John W. Hung, Profits, Pay and Team Work,
FIN. TuMEs, July 15, 1998, at 16 ("Study after study has failed to identify a strong
relationship between top management compensation and company performance."); Joann S.
Lublin, Pay For No Performance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R1 (reporting that in 1997
CEOs had an 11.7% increase in salaries and bonuses, but corporate profits rose only 8.9%).
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enormous amounts at a time when the corporation that employs them is not
perceived as earning the shareholders an adequate return on their
investment. One would expect a negative reaction to the receipt by ousted
Apple Computer CEO, Gilbert F. Amelio, of $6.7 million in severance pay
in 1997, in addition to $2 million in salary and bonuses for that year, given
that Apple suffered losses of almost $2 billion during Amelio's brief
seventeen-month tenure as the company's CEO. Although it is possible
that Apple's shareholders would have lost even more during that period had
Amelio not been at the helm, the disparity in how he fared compared to
shareholders is not viewed positively by shareholders or the general
public.6
Those who support the use of performance-based compensation
believe that such contingent compensation motivates executives and/or
rewards them.7 Performance-based compensation is seen as a means of
providing incentive for executives to perform in ways that maximize
corporate/shareholder wealth! and/or as a way of paying executives
5. See Lublin, supra note 4, at R1. In 1996, a year in which Apple shareholders lost
40% of their investment, Amelio received compensation of $23 million. See Daniel Kadlec,
How CEO Pay Got Away, TIME, Apr. 28, 1997, at 59. Similarly, several years ago criticism
focused on United Airline's compensation for CEO Stephen M. Wolf who was paid $17
million from 1990 to 1992, while shareholders lost an average of 26% a year on their United
Airlines shares. See BLAIR, supra note 3, at 9.
6. Seemingly excessive pay is not an issue that is limited to CEOs; other senior
executives of large public corporations are also compensated generously. See Joann S.
Lublin, Golden Heirs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R5 (concluding from an analysis of
1997 proxies that the gap in pay between CEOs and executives second-in-command at
major public corporations is narrowing). A few examples of non-CEO executive officers
who were quite generously compensated in 1997 are Pfizer Executive Vice President Henry
McKinnell, who received $787,000 in 1997, General Electric Senior Vice President Dennis
Dammerman, who received $1,025,000 in 1997, and Exxon Senior Vice President Robert
Wilhelm, who received $807,001 in 1997. See EXXON CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 14 (Mar.
18, 1998); GENERAL ELECTRIC CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 20 (Mar. 13, 1998); PFIZER CORP.,
PROXY STATemENT 21 (Mar. 19, 1998).
7. See, e.g., Bruce Overton, in EXEcuTIvE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIc GUIDE FOR
THE 1990s 325 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (stating that incentive compensation has the
"potential to motivate executives and focus their energies on behavior that directly supports
or fulfills organizational goals"); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For
The Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. LAW. 231, 240 (1983) (stating that contingent
compensation may either measure the contribution of managers or motivate managers).
8. See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 301, 306 (1995) (citing statement of Kevin Murphy that
compensation is not a zero-sum game and that providing better incentives to managers
simultaneously makes the manager and the shareholders better off); Kevin J. Murphy,
Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 724 (1995)
(proposing that companies that offer their CEOs lower base salaries in exchange for
potentially higher performance-related pay-offs provide incentives to create wealth); Dana
Wechsler, Would Adam Smith Pay Them So Much?, FORBES, May 28, 1990, at 210 (quoting
Warren Buffett to the effect that a really top executive is worth every penny he is paid. "A
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commensurately with their contribution to a corporation's growth and
performance. 9 Boards of directors assure their shareholders that contingent
compensation will motivate executives and align their interests with the
interests of shareholders. 10 Market reaction to the adoption of contingent
compensation plans suggests that shareholders (and prospective
shareholders) take those assurances at face value.'
million, $3 million or $10 million, [if they perform well], it's still peanuts."). But see
Executive Compensation: Hearings on S.1198 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. 2d Session (1992) [hereinafter Hearings on S.1198]
(statement of Sen. Boren) ("We would be less concerned about the amount of compensation
paid to executives if we believed that pay tracked performance.").
9. "More aggressive pay-for-performance systems (and a higher probability of
dismissal for poor performance) would produce sharply lower compensation for less
talented managers. Over time, these managers would be replaced by more able and more
highly motivated executives who would, on average, perform better and earn higher levels
of pay. Existing managers would have greater incentives to find creative ways to enhance
corporate performance and their pay would rise as well." Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-
June 1990, at 138, 139. The authors go on to explain that the increase in compensation
would not represent a transfer of wealth from shareholders to executives, but a reward to
managers for improving business performance and increasing the company success. See id.
That is, rather than taking a bigger piece of the existing pie, the executive is given a
generous slice of the bigger pie.
10. See, e.g., APPLE COMPUTER, PROXY STATEMENT 6 (Mar. 16, 1998) (explaining that
the principles of the company's executive compensation program are intended to motivate
executive officers to improve the financial position of the company); COSTCO, PROXY
STATEMENT 9 (Dec. 18, 1997) (stating that the board seeks to align total compensation for
senior management with corporate performance and the interests of shareholders); CROWN
CORK & SEAL, PROXY STATEMENT 12 (Mar. 23, 1998) (explaining that stock options are an
ideal way to link shareholder and executive interests); EXXON, PROXY STATEMENT 10 (Mar.
18, 1998) (informing shareholders that the company's executive compensation program is
designed to motivate executives by making significant portion of senior executive's
potential compensation dependent upon increased shareholder value); UAL, PROXY
STATEMENT 13 (Mar. 12, 1998) (describing the company's executive compensation program
as one which supports a pay-for-performance culture and emphasizes pay-at-risk).
The assumption that money motivates behavior is not limited to the use of money to
compensate workers. It is not uncommon to see money being used to attempt to motivate
students to perform better in school or to motivate people to lose weight or to quit smoking.
See Laura Koss-Feder, Take Out Employee Benefits: Incentives That Motivate Workers,
CRAiN's N.Y. Bus., June 9, 1997, at 32 (giving employees incentives to participate in
wellness programs); Joan Verdon, Schools Give Students Incentives to Improve, THE
REcORD, Mar. 7, 1988, at A01 (discussing experiments involving paying students for school
attendance or performance); Jack Williams, He Pushes Good 'Addiction', SAN DIEGO UNION
TRM., May 30, 1986, at D1 (reporting on the use of monetary incentives to promote fitness).
11. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Incentive Effects of Stock Purchase Plans, 14 J. FIN. ECON.
195 (1985) (believing market effect of adoption of stock plans to be proof of their incentive
effect); Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-
Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1985) (finding adoption of
golden parachutes to be associated with positive security market reaction); David F.
Larcker, The Association Between Performance Plan Adoption and Corporate Capital
Investment, 5 J. AccT. & ECON. 3 (1983) (finding announcement of adoption of long-term
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Although the concepts of "pay as motivator" and "pay as reward" are
related,1 2 the primary focus of this article is on the use of contingent
compensation as a means of motivating superior executive performance. 3
There may be no question that an executive's performance is a function of
ability, skill, and motivation.14 There also is no question that things other
than money motivate people. My focus, however, is on the role of money
and whether the assumption underlying contingent compensation-that "a
person will be motivated to work if rewards and penalties are tied directly
to his performance"'--is a valid one.1 6 This is an important question for
incentive compensation plan to be associated with positive securities market reaction;
suggesting that results may be attributable to tax or other effects rather than incentive
reasons); Hassan Tehranian & James F. Waegelein, Market Reaction to Short-Term
Executive Compensation Plan Adoption, 7 J. ACcT. & ECON. 131, 141 (1985) (finding
announcement of adoption of short-term incentive compensation plan to be associated with
positive abnormal returns, but suggesting that it is difficult to say whether the positive
returns are attributable to the adoption of the plan or other factors); see also Shelley Taylor,
Don't Wag That Dog!, INVESTOR REL. Q., Winter 1998, at 4, 5-6 (noting that "[i]n the
governance arena, what American (and European) investors care about most is linking
management's pay to share price performance," based on their belief that rewarding
management in the same way as shareholders creates accountability).
12. Even if one does not believe that pay affects how people behave, and that therefore
pay ought not be used as a motivator, one might still think that executive pay should reflect
how well executives have performed-i.e., that pay should be used as a reward. To some
extent, the effectiveness of using pay as a motivator is dependent on the extent to which
executives perceive that pay works as a reward. They must believe that pay will sufficiently
reward their effort in order to be willing to expend the effort. Therefore, for contingent
compensation to motivate future performance, pay must be sufficiently related to past
performance. In addition, when pay is examined after the fact, it will be hard not to be
critical of executives who receive high pay when company (and therefore, presumably
individual) performance has not been stellar.
13. This is not to deny that companies may use compensation to achieve other aims.
See infra note 135. Those other aims are not my focus, since my goal here is to consider
whether the oft-cited aim of motivating executives is attainable.
14. See VICTOR H. VROOM & EDWARD L. DECI, MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION 10
(1970); see also PAUL J. CHAMPAGNE & R. BRUCE McAFEE, MOTIVATING STRATEGIES FOR
PERFORMANCE AND PRODUCTIrrY 2-5 (1989) (stating that performance is a function of
ability and motivation); BRUCE R. ELLIG, ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION-A TOTAL PAY
PERSPECTIVE 24 (1982).
15. VROOM & DECI, supra note 14, at 13. How one measures that performance, via
measures of individual performance, company performance, or a combination thereof, is
another question. Although defining what constitutes performance is not the focus of this
article, the question of individual versus company performance is addressed in section
III.B.2.
16. This article focuses on the relationship between compensation and motivation. It
does not address the issue of the relationship between job satisfaction and job performance
or of the effect of contingent compensation on job satisfaction. Some authors have
suggested that the relationship between satisfaction and performance is affected by
contingent compensation. See H. Joseph Reitz & William E. Scott, Jr., Effects of Contingent
and Noncontingent Reward on the Relationship Between Satisfaction and Task
Performance, 55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 531, 535 (1971).
232 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:2
two reasons. First, it has implications for compensation decisions and for
the laws that provide the framework in which such decisions are made.
Not only are boards making decisions without questioning assumptions that
may simply be inaccurate, but Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") rely on the same unquestioned assumptions when
acting in ways that encourage contingent compensation. 17 Second, the use
of compensation as a motivator is viewed, among other things, as a vehicle
for addressing the agency problems inherent in the separation of ownership
and management of the corporate form."8 If, in fact, the assumptions
underlying this approach are faulty, corporations relying on performance-
based compensation as a means of addressing agency problems need to find
a different approach.19  Finally, even if the assumptions underlying
contingent compensation are valid, it is still important to address whether
performance-based compensation is currently structured and used in a way
that maximally motivates executives.
A fundamental problem with the drive toward using contingent
compensation as a means of motivating executives is that neither the boards
of directors, who design compensation packages, nor the government
agencies, who have adopted rules to encourage the use of performance-
Vroom and Deci regard a focus on satisfaction as an alternative approach to the use of
pay as a means of dealing with questions of what motivates workers to perform effectively.
They describe as paternalistic the assumption "that people will be motivated to perform their
jobs effectively to the extent to which they are satisfied with these jobs." VRooM & DECI,
supra note 14, at 11. This satisfaction approach utilizes unconditional rewards "in the sense
that the amount of reward that any individual receives is not dependent in any clear-cut way
on how he behaves within the organization, but rather on the fact that he is a member in that
organization." Id.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32. See generally John M. Abowd, Does
Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?, 43 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 52-S (1990) (stating that interest in performance-based compensation is
based on a belief that it provides a viable solution to the problem of aligning the interests of
managers and owners); Bhagat et al., supra note 11, at 195 (citing commentators suggesting
that equity-based compensation schemes address agency problems by aligning management
and shareholder interests); R. Haugen & L. Senbet, New Perspectives on Informational
Asymmetry and Agency Relationships, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIvE ANALYSIs 671 (1979)
(proposing use of stock options as an incentive device to eliminate agency problems).
19. This will not necessarily be easy. Other alternatives for addressing managerial
discretion have their own problems. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS 6 (1994) (describing the collective action problem that makes shareholders'
effective monitoring of managers difficult); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance,
Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 1403, 1425 (1985)
(rejecting the idea that markets are effective in constraining managerial discretion); Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1282-83 (1982)
(suggesting that independent directors do not serve as an effective curb on managerial
discretion because they may merely rubber stamp decisions due to a lack of expertise or
familiarity).
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based compensation, have considered the social science literature °
discussing motivation and the extent to which external incentives, such as
money, affect managerial behavior. The social science literature suggests
that determining whether performance-based compensation acts as a
successful motivator is more complicated than it may appear from a lay
discussion. This article considers the literature as a means of evaluating the
existing emphasis on performance-based compensation and suggests
modifications in the compensation structure and in the laws affecting the
compensation structure of corporate executives.
Part I of this article describes the increased use of contingent
compensation to motivate executives and the rationales supporting this
trend. Part II critiques the polar opposite of the assumption of the
effectiveness of the contingent compensation-the argument that any
attempt to motivate executives through contingent compensation is
inherently flawed. Part I concludes that there is insufficient evidence to
support a complete abandonment of the notion of trying to motivate
through compensation. Part IV surveys several psychological theories of
motivation and their application to existing compensation practices,
concluding that the potential motivational impact of contingent
compensation techniques is not being maximized. Part V offers some
suggestions for improvement.
I. THE FACE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
The term "contingent compensation" or "performance-based
compensation" can refer to several different methods of compensation,
ranging from the basic concept of merit pay22 to more sophisticated forms
20. Theories about contingent pay come from both psychology and economics fields.
"A theme common to both sets of theories is that linking pay to performance should
increase performance. A major difference between these sets of theories is the view on why
pay based on performance is likely to lead to better performance." HENEMAN, supra note 3,
at 24. Heneman further explains that, in contrast to psychological theories, economic
theories are directed toward the operation of the firm or market rather than the motivation of
individuals within the firm or market. See id. at 35. This article primarily considers
theories that are rooted in psychology.
21. There is no dearth of research on motivation. "More papers, chapters, and books
have been written about motivation and it has been the subject of more theories-and
theoretical controversy-than any other single topic [of organizational research]. Thus, a
strong case can be made for the view that motivation-the internal processes that activate,
guide, and maintain behavior (especially goal directed behavior) is one of the most pivotal
concerns of modem organizational research." Robert A. Baron, Motivation in Work
Settings: Reflections on the Core of Organizational Research, 15 MoTIVAToN & EMOTION
1 (1991). However, very little of the discussion has gone on in business circles where the
use and value of performance based compensation is accepted without question. See BOK,
supra note 3, at 106.
22. The term "merit pay" is generally used to refer to "individual pay increases based
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of short or long-term incentive compensation. A typical executive
compensation package includes several types of contingent compensation,
most typically short-term bonus plan payments, and one or more forms of
long-term compensation,3 such as stock options and/or stock bonuses.
Short-term incentive compensation plans generally provide for an
annual payment to executives based upon certain measures of company
performance. 24  Generally, a board's compensation committee, in
consultation with outside compensation consultants, will design a plan
establishing benchmarks for corporate performance in certain categories,
such as earnings per share, return on assets, or return on equity.25 If the
company achieves those benchmarks in a given year, a bonus is paid for
that year. If the benchmark is exceeded, a larger amount is paid. If the
goal is not met, either a smaller amount or no bonus is paid. Pay according
on the rated performance of individual employees in a previous time period .... While
[merit pay] is based on previous performance, it is intended to motivate increased
performance in future periods." HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 6. One way in which merit pay
differs from other forms of contingent compensation is that merit pay is generally based on
subjective ratings rather than on objective ones or on measurable indicators of performance.
See id. at 12. Also, once obtained, merit pay loses its contingent aspect, typically taking the
form of a permanent salary increase that is based on performance. See id. at 15.
This article does not address merit pay in its basic function of merit salary increases.
Executive salary increases are generally based on a combination of merit and market. See,
e.g., CATERPILLAR, PROXY STATEMENT 9 (Feb. 27, 1998); LOCKHEED MARTIN, PROXY
STATEMENT 14 (Mar. 19, 1998); OMNICOM, PROXY STATEMENT 9 (May 18, 1998); PFIZER,
PROXY STATEMENT 24 (Mar. 19, 1998); SNAP-ON, PROXY STATEMENT 12 (Mar. 13, 1998)
(each describing factors considered by board compensation committees in determining
compensation).
23. See Larcker, supra note 11, at 5-6 (describing various types of long-term
compensation plans).
24. See Tehranian & Waegelein, supra note 11, at 132 (describing general
characteristics of short-term incentive plans). Sometimes such plans may also take into
account individual performance for a portion of the payout. However, this is generally not
done with the CEO, since often the only way to judge a CEO's performance is by company
performance. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
25. There is no consensus over what measures should be used. Compare IRA T. KAY,
VALUE AT THE Top: SoLuTIoNs TO THE ExEcUTIVE COMPENSATION CRISIS 189 (1992)
(criticizing the use of accounting measures), with Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive
Compensation: Will the New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?,
61 UMKC L. REv. 537, 564 (1993) (citing research supporting accounting measures).
A company's industry and its own particular goals may affect what measures are
chosen. For example, a manufacturer with sluggish sales might wish to use sales income as
a measure whereas a financial institution concerned with its level of non-interest expense
might use net non-interest income as a measure. Despite some individual variation, there
are some measures that crop up over and over again. According to one study using data
from the Fortune 100, to determine bonuses under short-term incentive plans, 37% of the
companies used return on equity as a measure, 32% used net income, 29% used earnings per
share, 27% used stock price appreciation, and 23% used pre-tax profit. See William E.
Lissy & Marlene L. Morgenstern, Currents in Compensation & Benefits, 27 COMPENSATION
&BENEFITREv., Sept. 19, 1995, at 10.
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to such plans is thus contingent on corporate achievement of certain
predetermined objectives.
The most prevalent form of long-term compensation is the stock
option.26 A stock option grants the holder of the option the right (but not
the obligation) to purchase a specified number of shares of company stock
at a price that is fixed at the date of grant.27 The option exercise price is
typically the fair market value on the date of grant of the shares subject to
the option.2' Generally, options become exercisable over time and remain
exercisable for a period of ten years. Since the expectation is that the price
of the company's stock will rise between the grant date and the exercise
date of the option, the exercise of an option is the functional equivalent of
the purchase of stock at a discount from the price at which the stock is
trading on the date of purchase/exercise.
Another form of stock compensation often used is the granting of
bonus stock. Bonus stock is "free" stock; awarding bonus stock is like
granting an option with an exercise price of zero dollars. Generally, bonus
shares vest over time, and thus cannot be sold for some period after the
grant.29 The primary difference between options and bonus stock is that an
26. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN ExEcutivEs 175 (1991) (stating that stock options are the favorite form of long-
term incentive compensation); Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock
Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FiN. 31, 42 (1997) (describing stock options as an almost universal compensation method
and noting that 94% of the country's largest 250 companies compensate their executives
with stock options).
Traditionally, options were granted only to top executives. However, according to
one recent commentator, "they are now handed out to roughly 50 percent of midlevel
professionals at major companies, and many surveys show that at least 1 in 10 of the
companies offer them to most of their employees." Adam Bryant, Feeding the New Work
Ethic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, § 4, at 1; see also Liz Moyer, Dime Offers Stock Option
Plan, AM. BANKER, May 21, 1997, at 9 (reporting on expansion of stock option programs by
Dime, Chase Manhattan, and BankAmerica to cover non-executive employees).
27. See generally Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1750 (1994) (discussing the perceived importance of rewarding key
employees with stock options); Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of Incentive Stock
Options-Turning Employee Income Into Gold, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 492-93 (1983)
(discussing issues related to recognizing the stock option as income at the time of grant). In
order to avoid recognizing an expense for accounting purposes, the number of shares and
the option price have to be fixed at grant. See APB OPINION No. 25, Accounting for Stock
Issued to Employees, [ 5 (Accounting Principles Board 1972).
28. While options need not be granted with an exercise price equal to fair market value
at the date of grant, doing so is common and reasonable. First, if a corporation wants to
grant incentive stock options, thus obtaining favorable tax treatment, the options must be
granted with an exercise price no less than fair market value. See 26 U.S.C. §
422(b)(4)(1994). Second, it is necessary to grant options with an exercise price at least
equal to fair market value in order to avoid having to recognize an accounting expense for
the option. See APB OPINION No. 25, supra note 27, 5.
29. See Richard Dieter et al., Accounting for Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 393
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option provides no value (and hence no compensation) unless the
company's stock rises after the date of grant, whereas bonus stock
guarantees that the executive receives something even if the company's
stock falls (so long as it doesn't fall to zero dollars). Another difference is
that generally an executive who is granted bonus stock gets full dividend
payments from the date of grant, whereas with options, no dividends are
paid on the underlying shares until exercise of the option.30
The focus on the use of these various forms of contingent
compensation as a means of motivating executives reflects a concern with
addressing the agency costs created by the separation of ownership and
management inherent in the corporate form of organization.3' Some
mechanism is necessary to address the fact that the interests of owners and
managers sometimes diverge. Since it is not practical for owners to
monitor managers directly on a day-to-day basis, something else is needed
to ensure that managers work in the best interest of shareholders.
Contingent compensation is one alternative to direct monitoring. It
attempts to minimize agency costs by making it financially advantageous
for executives to behave in a way that serves the interests of owners.32
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO A40 (1993); Michael R. Flyer, Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation, in C 803 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: TAX AND BusINESs PLANNING AND
RESTRUCTURING FOR THE '90s 233, 264 (1993).
Generally, once stock vests, it is nonforfeitable. However, it is possible to structure a
bonus stock program which retains forfeitability of shares. See, e.g., COCA-COLA, PROXY
STATEMENT 18 (Mar. 12, 1998) (stating that although shares are earned in 20% increments,
once shares are earned the executive must remain with the company for five years and may
not compete for two years following termination to receive shares).
30. This is because when an executive is awarded bonus stock, ownership occurs
immediately, entitling the executive to both voting and dividend rights upon the grant of the
stock. See David S. Foster & Walter M. Kolligs, Promoting a Sense of Ownership, in
COMPENSATION PLANNING FOR EXECUTIVES IN A NEV ENvIRONMENT 1992, at 339, 347 (PLI
Tax L. & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 329, 1992).
Although these are the most popular forms of long-term compensation, other forms of
long-term compensation include a combination of restricted stock and cash payouts based
on corporate performance targets being met at the end of a three or five-year performance
cycle. See, e.g., CATERPILLAR, PROXY STATEMENT 13 (Feb. 24, 1998); CONAGRA, PROXY
STATEMENT 14 (Aug. 21, 1998), and deferred compensation, payable only at the end of an
executive's career, based on a formula which measures the company's asset value and
earning power value. See, e.g., JOHNSON & JOHNSON, PROXY STATEMENT 9 (Mar. 11, 1998).
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 171-72 (6th ed. 1996); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BuSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 305, 308-10 (2d ed. 1990); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
32. "An effective pay package will minimize the costs of the agency relationship
between owners and managers." Wilbur Lewellen et al., Executive Compensation and
Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis, 9 J. ACCT. & ECON. 287, 287 (1987);
see also Abowd, supra note 18, at 53-S to 55-S (discussing literature regarding use of pay to
reduce agency costs).
MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES
Thus, boards structure compensation packages so as to motivate
executives to behave in a manner consistent with shareholders' interests.
Short-term incentive plans, with receipt of bonus amounts dependent on
achievement of certain targets, send a signal to executives that those targets
are valuable. Long-term incentive plans, particularly those that give
executives an equity interest in the corporation, aim to give the executives a
longer-term view than they might otherwise possess if they were only
compensated with current cash by putting the executives in a position
similar to that of the shareholders.
The movement toward performance-based compensation has been
fueled, or at least supported, by the federal government. The Securities and
Exchange Commission's 1992 amendments to the proxy rules require that a
company's proxy statement include a performance graph that compares the
shareholders' return with the market as a whole or with a peer group of
companies.33 This graph must accompany a report of the board's
compensation committee 34  explaining both the board's general
compensation philosophy and its specific compensation decisions with
respect to the company's most highly paid executive officers.35  These
Agency costs cannot be completely eliminated by the use of contingent compensation
because the board would remain dependent on management for information. See Anne T.
Coughlan & Ronald M. Schmidt, Executive Compensation, Management Turnover and
Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON, 43, 45 (1985)
(reporting that agency problems are not solved because boards are making compensation
decisions based only on information supplied to them by management).
33. The required graph compares the company's total shareholder return against those
of a broad market index and a peer group. If a company is in the Standard and Poor's 500
("S&P 500"), it must use that index. If a company is not in the S&P 500, it can use an index
that includes companies on an exchange, traded on the NASDAQ, or that are of similar
market capitalizations. The peer comparison can be made on the basis of a published
industry or line-of-business or on the basis of a peer group selected by the company, so long
as the basis for selection is closed. See 17 C.F.R. § 229A02(l)(i), (ii) (1998).
34. Although the board of directors has the power to set the compensation of
executives, see supra note 2, the vast majority of boards delegate that authority to
compensation committees. See ANDREw HACKER, MoNEY: WHO HAS How MUCH AND WHY
112 (1997) (noting that virtually all boards have compensation committees); James W.
Fisher, Jr., The Role of the Compensation Committee, in ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990s, 366, 366 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (according to recent
surveys 84-99% of large companies have compensation committees establishing executive
compensation).
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1996). The report that must be submitted by the board
compensation committee must describe the bases for executive compensation decisions,
including the relationship to company performance. The factors and criteria on which the
CEO's salary was based must be specified as well. See id. § 229.402(k)(2).
The 1992 amendments made significant changes in how compensation of executives
is reported to shareholders. The aim of the amendments was to provide shareholders with
clearer and more understandable information. See id. § 229.402(a)(2) (describing desire to
provide "clear, concise, and understandable disclosure" of compensation awarded to senior
executive officers). The four main tables required by the rules include a summary
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amendments encourage board committees to think in terms of performance-
based compensation, since such pay will be more easily justified to
shareholders whose focus has been drawn to company performance by the
graph. In addition, when Congress amended section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code") to disallow a deduction for compensation in
excess of $1 million paid to senior executive officers,36 it allowed an
exception for compensation that hinges on the "attainment of one or more
performance goals." 37 Thus, to the extent that a company wants to provide
deductible compensation in excess of $1 million, it must be in the form of
performance-based compensation, which is exactly the result Congress was
seeking to achieve.3"
compensation table, two option and stock appreciation right tables, and a table dealing with
long-term incentive plan awards. See id. § 402(a)(1)(i). The essential table is the summary
compensation table, which contains all compensation paid during the previous three years to
the CEO and to the four most highly paid executive officers with salaries and bonuses in
excess of $100,000 for the last completed fiscal year. See id. §§ 229.402(b)(1),
229.402(a)(3)(i)-(iii) and Instruction 1 to Item 402(a)(3). See generally Susan Cooper
Philpot, Proxy Statements and Proxies Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in
SECuRrrmis FILINGS 1998, at 229 (PLI Corp L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
1081, 1998); Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to
Facilitate Market Forces, 72 NsB. L. REV. 803, 811 (1993) (describing the rule changes).
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (1994). Under prior law, executive compensation was tax
deductible as long as it was "reasonable." Section 162(m), enacted in 1993, provides that a
public corporation will not receive a tax deduction for covered employees whose
compensation is over $1 million unless the excess amounts are based on "the attainment of
one or more performance goals." 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C). The term "covered
employees" includes the CEO and the four highest paid executives who are in office on the
last day of the fiscal year. However, two bills, which did not pass, were introduced that
would have extended the section to all employees. See Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G.
Wagner, Recent Developments in Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation
Plans: New Concerns for Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 5, 14 (1997).
37. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C). To qualify for the exception, a compensation
committee, composed solely of two or more outside directors, must certify in writing that
the covered employee has satisfied "one or more preestablished, objective performance
goals." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i)(1995). Measures such as stock prices, market share,
sales volume, earnings per share, return on equity, or cost can be used to establish the goals.
The material terms of the performance goals must also be approved by a majority
shareholder vote. 'Material" terms include (1) the individuals eligible to receive the
compensation, (2) the criteria used, and (3) either a formula which can be used to calculate
compensation or a maximum amount which can be paid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
27(e)(4)(i). If the compensation involves stock options, shareholder approval must include
approval of the option price or formula used to set the price and the maximum number of
shares that can be awarded. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(iv); see also FED. TAX GumE
REP. PG-2360 (CCH) (Aug. 20, 1993).
38. Section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue-raising provision, but a behavior-
shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensation 'is not a loophole."'
Meegan M. Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation Cap, 62
TAX NOTES 747, 747 (1994) (quoting Catherine Creech, former Treasury benefits tax
counsel, Address at Meeting of the District of Columbia Bar (Feb. 2, 1994)). Thus,
Congress' aim in enacting § 162(m) and the exception for performance-based pay was to
MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES
A number of studies have attempted to assess the effectiveness of
contingent compensation, and several studies have concluded that such
plans positively influence company and/or individual performance.
39
However, it is difficult to assess those conclusions for several reasons.
First, a number of the studies involve lower level managers or non-
managerial employees,40 and their results may or may not be translatable to
plans involving executives. One can posit reasons why lower-level
employees would be more or less likely to be motivated by performance-
based compensation. On the one hand, the fact that rank and file
employees have a lower base salary than executives may mean that
contingent compensation will be more likely to positively affect their
performance, since the potential to receive additional dollars may be more
meaningful.41 On the other hand, it is less clear that compensation in the
form of stock grants or stock option grants will motivate rank and file
employees because the link between their actions and a company's stock
price is less direct than with executives.42 These factors make it difficult to
encourage performance-based compensation. See Hearings on S.1198, supra note 8, at 2.
"[W]e would be less concerned about the amount of compensation paid to executives if we
believed that pay tracked performance." Id.
39. See infra notes 40-43. Some of the studies address contingent compensation based
on individual performance. Others address contingent compensation based on company
performance, assuming that if a company performs well after adopting a plan, individual
performance must have been positively affected by the plan. The discussion in later
sections of this article addresses studies concluding generically that contingent
compensation yields certain results. Studies attempting to address specific motivational
hypotheses are discussed as relevant in section I.
40. See Diana L. Deadrick & K. Dow Scott, Employee Incentives in the Public Sector
A National Survey of Urban Mass Transit Authorities, 16 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 135, 141
(1987) (finding from questionnaire survey of 850 transit directors that merit pay programs
are effective); Robert L. Opsahl & Marvin D. Dunnette, The Role of Financial
Compensation in Industrial Motivation, in VROOM & DECI, supra note 14, at 133 (citing
evidence suggesting that incentive pay systems result in greater output per man hour and
lower unit costs than straight pay systems).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 132-141 (discussing why the typically high base
salary of executives minimizes the motivating potential of performance-based
compensation).
42. See Bhagat et al., supra note 11, at 208 (stating that among lower level employees,
there is a "free rider problem"; each employee hopes the group collectively will produce so
that he or she can benefit, but each individual has limited incentive to participate personally
because his or her effort will not have a big effect on share value); George Milkovich &
Carolyn Milkovich, Strengthening the Pay-Performance Relationship: The Research,
COMPENSATION & BENEFIrrs REv., Nov. 1, 1992, at 53, available in 1992 WL 3079143
(commenting that profit sharing and bonus plans create a "line of sight" problem among
lower-level employees because only a few employees can see a direct connection between
their performance and the company's profits); Bryant, supra note 26, §4, at 4 (stating that
lower level employees "don't quite know what they can do differently to help lift the stock
price - except, at consumer-goods companies, maybe buying more of their company's own
products").
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draw conclusions about the effectiveness of contingent compensation on
executive performance from studies of nonexecutive employees.
Second, and more importantly, a number of the studies that show
improved performance after the plans are introduced are explicitly
inconclusive regarding causation.43 This may be because the studies do not
control for the level of pay, tax consequences, or for other changes in the
workplace that may accompany the adoption of a contingent compensation
plan.44 For example, many companies that reported improved results
following adoption of incentive plans also made significant changes in
corporate culture at the same time, making it difficult to assess the extent to
which adoption of the contingent pay arrangement affected performance.
45
43. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 11, at 195 (suggesting that stock purchase plans
have positive incentive effect, but basing that conclusion merely on market reaction to
adoption of the plans); Larcker, supra note 11, at 27-28 (finding evidence that firms
adopting performance plans experience a statistically significant growth in capital
investment, but that it is problematic to directly attribute these results to the 'incentive
effect' of performance plans); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure,
Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 169, 176-78 (1995) (finding a
positive linear correlation between fir performance and the portion of the CEO's
compensation that is equity-based, but unable to demonstrate causation); Tehranian &
Waegelein, supra note 11, at 140-41 (finding that firms adopting short-term compensation
plans experience positive abnormal returns two months after the adoption announcement
and that these returns are associated with positive unexpected earnings, but noting that these
results could either be because the plan provided executives with incentive to increase
earnings or that managers knew that earnings were likely to be unexpectedly high and were
instrumental in getting the board to adopt a plan that would reward that result); Rajesh
Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and
Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence (Mar. 1997) (suggesting the need to
take into account other factors such as manager risk-aversion and product market
characteristics in evaluating performance-based incentives) (working draft on file with
author).
44. See Abowd, supra note 18, at 552 (stating that studies on effect of contingent
compensation do not control for tax consequences, making it difficult to determine incentive
effect); Lawrence M. Kahn & Peter D. Sherer, Contingent Pay and Managerial
Performance, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 107-S, 108-S to 109-S (1990) (discussing failure
to control for level of pay).
45. See Douglas B. Myers, How a Shift in Corporate Culture Has Increased Plano
Bank & Trust's Shareholder Value, 19 J. RETAIL BANKING SERVICES 7 (1997) (describing
changes in corporate culture at a Dallas bank and trust company, accompanying the
adoption of contingent compensation plans).
There is also a more cynical explanation for why performance in certain areas may
increase following adoption of a performance-based plan: corporate managers adopt those
forms of compensation that are consistent with their expectations. Under that theory,
employers adopt performance-based compensation only when they expect the company to
do well. If such plans are only adopted during periods when expectations are high (such as
during a period when the stock market is generally doing well) it is no surprise that the
company will seem to perform well following adoption of the plan. More specifically, if
managers think certain aspects of a company's performance, for example, sales, may do
well in a subsequent period, they may adopt a short-term incentive plan that rewards
employees if certain sales levels are met. Then, when the targets are met, they can say the
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Finally, not surprisingly, other studies conclude that there is no
statistical relationship between contingent compensation decisions and
performance.46 In light of the difficulty in forming conclusions about
contingent compensation based on these types of empirical studies, the
following sections of this article will explore the social science literature
about the nature of motivation as a means of evaluating the attempt to
motivate managerial performance through compensation.
II. AT THE EXTREME: THE COMPLETE REJECTION OF MONEY AS A
MOTIVATOR
The polar opposite of the assumption of the effectiveness of
contingent compensation is the position that completely rejects the notion
that monetary rewards improve performance. The rejection is based on
several factors, most notably the beliefs that (1) pay is not a motivator; (2)
rewards undermine intrinsic interest; and (3) rewards punish.
47
A. Money As a Motivator
The argument that the potential for additional pay is not a motivator is
crucial, since money must be important to a person before a promise of
more money could possibly motivate that person. Although it may seem
plan worked to motivate increased sales, when, in fact, the same results would have been
achieved absent adoption of the plan.
46. See, e.g., Atul Mitra et al., The Case of the Invisible Merit Raise: How People See
Their Pay Raises, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., May 15, 1995, available in 1995 WL
8473991 (concluding that employers should be concerned that huge raises have no
motivational effect and, therefore, do not increase performance, even if they do increase
morale and satisfaction).
47. Those who completely reject the use of monetary rewards do so on the grounds that
rewards rupture relationships both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal relationships
suffer because incentive programs are often structured in a way that reduces the likelihood
that workers will cooperate with each other, and vertical relationships suffer because when
the person to whom a worker reports has control over how much the worker makes, the
worker is more likely to conceal problems and less likely to ask for help. See, e.g., KOHN,
supra note 1, at 54, 55; see also Dana Wechsler Linden & Vicki Contavespi, Incentivize Me,
Please, FoRnEs, May 27, 1991, at 208, 211 (citing W. Edwards Deming's conclusion that
the incentive system destroys teamwork, making coworkers overly competitive); Tie
Incentives to Goals for Results, S.F. Bus. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7731822 (citing compensation consultant Wayne Dunlap to the effect that individual
performance incentives discourage teamwork).
This is not likely to be a concern in the case of a CEO, who has no peers and is
usually judged by the board of directors. There is no evidence on the extent to which
rewards may harm relationships among senior executives or between senior executives and
the CEO, who evaluates their performance. I think there would be no such harm because
senior management generally works closely together and the rewards given to one generally
do not diminish or limit the rewards available to others.
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counter-intuitive to suggest that money does not motivate, critics of
contingent compensation argue that money is not as significant a factor in
how people live and work as many people believe.48 Rather, they propose
that workers who have enough money to afford basic necessities-a
category that obviously includes executives-care much more about the
non-monetary aspects of their employment situation. Those making this
argument take the position that reputation, job satisfaction, security, and
other factors are stronger motivators than money.49 Even those who
48. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 1, at 36, 4243; Nancy C. Morse & Robert S. Weiss,
The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job, in VROOM & DEc, supra note 14, at 42,
43 (arguing that working is more than a means of economic support; evidence supports the
argument that most people would work even if they did not need to for financial reasons);
Herbert H. Meyer, The Pay-for-Performance Dilemma, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS,
Winter 1975, at 39, 40 (arguing that people do not work just for money and if the interest
and challenge of the work are held constant, it would be difficult to demonstrate that highly
paid persons would put out more effort than those less well paid).
49. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 3, at 22-23 (citing Chester I. Barnard, the author of THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE ExEctrrvE (1940) and W. Edwards Deming, "the father of 'total quality
management,"' as well as several psychologists, questioning the effectiveness of monetary
incentives as the incentive for action); Yungsan Kim, Long-Term Firm Performance and
Chief Executive Turnover: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 480,
480 (1996) (citing the 1980 study by FAMA, suggesting that a manager's concern about his
reputation and career can provide such a strong motivation that it can resolve the managerial
incentive problem without the use of explicit incentive compensation, and the 1982 study of
Holmstrom, arguing that once reputation is established, the marginal effect of current
performance on the executive's reputation becomes small); Bernadette M. Ruf & Leonard
H. Chusmir, Dimensions of Success and Motivation Needs Among Managers, 125 J.
PSYCHOL. 631 (1992) (stating that power and achievement correlate with personal
fulfillment and other factors rather than merely with wealth); Linden & Contavespi, supra
note 47, at 211 (citing W. Edwards Deming, who argues that people are primarily motivated
by self-esteem, dignity and love of learning, rather than money).
This is even true for lower-paid workers. See Jeff O'Heir, Motivation is Topic at
CFO Conference, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Mar. 10, 1997, at 135 (stating that
challenging work and recognition are more important to non-executive high-tech employees
than is competitive pay); Edward D. Sargent, D.C. Teachers in Study Reject Merit-Pay Plan,
WASH. POST, May 30, 1984 (reporting that career development and recognition were more
important to teachers than money).
"Need theorists" also reject money, in and of itself, as a motivator. Rather, they
believe that human motivation stems from basic sets of needs. Money may be an end to
lower level needs, but for high achievers, the higher level needs must be met before there
can be positive effects on performance, job endurance, and satisfaction. See generally A.H.
MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 80-92 (1954) (proposing a hierarchical
arrangement of five basic needs); Clayton P. Alderfer, An Empirical Test of a New Theory
of Human Needs, 4 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 142, 145-47 (1969)
(proposing three basic needs, money falling under "existence needs"). "Needs theorists" do
have their critics. See, e.g., Mahmoud A. Wahba & Lawrence B. Bridwell, Maslow
Reconsidered: A Review of Research on the Need Hierarchy Theory, 15 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & HuM. PERFORMANCE 212, 233-36 (1976) (criticizing Maslow's theory on the
ground that it suffers from conceptual and operational shortcomings); John P. Wanhous &
Abram Zwany, A Cross-Sectional Test of Need Hierarchy Theory, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL
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acknowledge that money may be a motivator in certain circumstances
question whether pay has more than a marginal impact on executives who
already possess substantial wealth. 0 Others suggest that money is a greater
or lesser motivator depending on where the recipient is in his or her
career.51
The difficulty with claims that money does or does not motivate is that
money is frequently associated with factors that those rejecting its use as a
motivator generally accept as important in motivating people. These
factors include achievement, status, reputation, and security. This
association may have one of several results. First, it may result in money
becoming a conditioned incentive. That is, "repeated pairings of money
with primary incentives establish a new learned drive for money. ' '5 2 Thus,
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 78, 94 (1977) (discussing both Maslow and Alderfer).
50. See BOK, supra note 3, at 244; KOHN, supra note 1, at 36 (arguing that for reward to
cause someone to act in a certain way, the recipient of the reward must be needy enough for
the reward to reinforce the desired behavior).
There is no question that money acts as an anxiety reducer, in the sense that absence
of money, and therefore the absence of an ability to satisfy physical needs, is anxiety-
provoking. However, even for average workers, "[o]nce a certain minimum level of living
has been achieved, human behavior is directed largely towards some social goal or goals."
Arthur H. Brayfield & Walter H. Crockett, Employee Attitudes and Employee Performance,
in MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION 72, 74 (Victor H. Vroom & Edward L. Deci eds., 1970)
(suggesting that goals such as achievement and acceptance by others are as significant for
average workers as is satisfying basic physical needs). Executives are even less likely than
average workers to be driven by a concern for money merely for its ability to satisfy basic
physical needs.
51. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, EXECUTIvE COMPENSATION: MONEY, MOTIVATION,
AND IMAGINATION 21 (1978) (citing research that has "shown that the value an individual
places on various types of compensation changes over a period of time in accordance with
his current needs"); G.H. Foote, Compensation and the Executive Career Cycle, in THE
ARTS OF TOP MANAGEMENT, A McKINSEY ANTHOLOGY (Roland Mann ed., 1971); Kim,
supra note 49, at 496 (suggesting that as the tenure of a chief executive officer increases, the
value of incentive compensation to maintain the CEO's incentive to perform increases). But
see Neil M. Ford et al., Differences in the Attractiveness of Alternate Rewards Among
Industrial Salespeople: Additional Evidence, 13 J. Bus. RES. 123, 135-37 (1985) (finding
that money does not lose its attractiveness over time and also finding an across the board
low valence attached to recognition as reward).
Some argue that executives, particularly CEOs, are likely to already be working as
hard as they can, meaning that money cannot motivate them to work any harder. See, e.g.,
K.R. SRINIVASA MURTHY, CORPORATE STRATEGY AND ToP ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION 79-
80 (1977) ("Top executives work hard for their firms, anyway, and a change in their
compensation would not result either in increased effort or in a better corporate
performance."); Graef Crystal, Incentives Fail to Improve Kodak's Picture, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 8, 1993, at 14. However, the use of contingent compensation for
executives is not so much aimed at getting more work out of executives, but rather, at
getting better decisions. The idea is to provide incentives for executives to make decisions
that will benefit the company and its shareholders in the long and short term. See supra text
accompanying notes 31-32.
52. Opsahl & Dunnette, supra note 40, at 129.
244 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:2
money may not have been a primary motivator of human behavior at one
time, but it has become a learned motivator. Secoiid, the association means
that money is viewed as an instrument for gaining desired outcomes. This
is simply the notion that money may not be an important motivator for its
own sake, but rather for the security it affords. 3 Third is the related notion
that money acquires importance as a symbol of achievement, in the sense
that it provides visible external evidence of one's achievement, not
otherwise knowable by others. 4 Again, the notion is that money for its
own sake is not a motivator, but that money, because of what its acquisition
symbolizes to others about the acquirer, is important.
Researchers who have identified distinct components of achievement
motivation,55  such as concern for excellence, competitiveness,
56acquisitiveness, status with experts, or status with peers, have concluded
that the motive to achieve is distinct from acquisitiveness for money.57
Jackson, Ahmed and Heapy, for example, postulate that there are "distinct
types of individuals in which motives to excel, to acquire money, to seek
status, and to compete are present in different proportions. 58 They posit,
for example, that two individuals might be in the same percentile in
achievement motivation and may have equivalent positions on the
excellence dimension, but the first might be low and the second high on
competitiveness and acquisitiveness. 59  They suggest the first type of
53. See MURTHY, supra note 51, at 26 (stating that through conditioning, individuals
associate money with a cessation of anxiety); Opsahl & Dunnette, supra note 40, at 131-32
(citing Gellerman as suggesting that money in itself has no intrinsic meaning except that it
acquires motivating force when it comes to symbolize intangible goals).
54. See CHAMPAGNE & MCAFEE, supra note 14, at 73 (stating that "[t]he financial
payoff for working is an important way of stating the value of a person's work"); MURTrHY,
supra note 51, at 26 ("For persons with a high need for achievement, money has a special
significance; it is a measure of their accomplishment."); MICHAEL NASH, MAKING PEOPLE
PRODUCTIVE: WHAT REALLY WORKS IN RAISING MANAGERIAL AND EMPLOYEE
PERFORMANCE 114 (1985) ("High achievers do not work just for money, but money is
important to them as a symbol of higher achievement."); Douglas N. Jackson et al., Is
Achievement a Unitary Concept?, 10 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1, 3 (1976). The importance of
pay for this purpose obviously varies by individual. See Henk Thierry, Payment: Which
Meanings Are Rewarding?, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCi. 694, 701 (1992) (stating that the
significance of pay to an employee is controlled by the degree to which pay relates to
cognitions of self).
55. See David C. McClelland, The Role of Money in Managing Motivation, in
MANAGERIAL MOTIVATION AND COMPENSATION (H.L. Tosi et al. eds., 1972); see also
EDWARD E. LAWLER m, MOTIVATION IN WORK ORGANIZATIONS 21-22 (1973) (discussing
McClelland's research).
56. See Richard E. Snow & Douglas N. Jackson III, Individual Differences in Conation:
Selected Constructs and Measures, in MOTIVATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 71, 81 (Harold
F. O'Neil, Jr. & Michael Drillings eds., 1994); Jackson et al., supra note 54, at 17.
57. See Jackson et al., supra note 54, at 18.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 17.
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individual would most likely be found engaging in scientific activity and
the second in business, 60 suggesting that executives are more likely to score
high on the acquisitiveness scale.
Thus, at least for some people (particularly those engaged in
business), money, for its own sake, may be a significant motivator. For
others, it may not motivate on its own, but motivate because of its
instrumental or symbolic importance. That means that for many people,
money will, directly or indirectly, be a motivating force.
The remainder of this section briefly addresses the other two aspects
of the position that completely rejects the use of money as a motivator.
B. Effect of Rewards on Intrinsic Interest
Those who completely reject the notion that contingent compensation
can positively affect performance also argue that extrinsic motivators are
both less effective than intrinsic motivation and, more importantly, have an
adverse impact upon intrinsic motivation.61 The mere existence of research
suggesting that the best workers are intrinsically motivated 62-- that is,
motivated by internal or assimilated norms6 3-and that interest in a task is
higher when the employee is not being rewarded for doing so, is not cause
60. See id. Similarly, it has been suggested that "[m]ore often than not, theorists who
believe that people do not work for money are academicians whose own value systems or
whose organizations' mores say that money is not that important." NASH, supra note 54, at
164-65.
61. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 40. Concern for the possible harmful effects of extrinsic
rewards originally arose from research involving token rewards in educational settings,
where results indicated that a child's "love of learning" could be permanently destroyed if
rewards were given for the performance of tasks. Kelli J. Skaggs et al., The Use of
Concurrent Schedules to Evaluate the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on "Intrinsic
Motivation": A Replication, 12 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT. 45, 46 (1992). With the
increased use of performance-contingent reward systems in business, researchers became
concerned that extrinsic motivation may decrease intrinsic motivation in the workplace. See
id. at47.
62. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 133 (stating that individuals who are committed to
excellence and likely to do the best work are particularly unlikely to respond to financial
incentives); MARTIN MORF, OPTIMIZING WORK PERFORMANCE: A LOOK BEYOND THE
BoTroM LINE 51 (1986). Intrinsically-motivated behavior is believed to be more creative,
spontaneous and flexible than extrinsically-motivated behavior. See EDwARD L. DECI &
R.M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HurMAN BEHAVIOR 35
(1985); John Condry, Enemies of Exploration: Self-Initiated Versus Other-Initiated
Learning, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 459,462 (1977).
63. The intrinsic motivation may, for example, be task involvement motivation, where
the activity is perceived as inherently satisfying and the individual is mainly concerned with
assessing and developing individual mastery, or ego involvement motivation, where the
attention is focused on assessing ability in relation to others.
64. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 68 (stating that if the goal is quality or lasting
commitment, external incentives are less effective than intrinsic motivation).
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for concern. However, these would be cause for concern if the use of
rewards to motivate does actually undermine the intrinsic motivation that
65promotes optimal performance.
Two reasons have been offered to explain why rewards might
decrease intrinsic motivation: (1) anything presented as a prerequisite for
something else, as a means toward some other end, comes to be seen as less
desirable,66 and (2) rewards are often perceived as a threat to autonomy,
resulting in rebellion as a response to the threat.67 The result is a decline in
68intrinsic motivation.
However, the evidence on this point is far from consistent. Many
argue that the concept of intrinsic motivation is difficult to define or
measure, making it difficult to judge whether pay affects it.69 Others find
that performance-based compensation may actually increase intrinsic
65. See DECI & RYAN, supra note 62, at 298 ("[T]he research has consistently shown
that any contingent pay system tends to undermine intrinsic motivation. The use of rewards
to motivate behavior can, in general, be said to be deleterious to intrinsic motivation.");
KOHN, supra note 1, at 69-70 (citing studies by Deci and Lepper); MORF, supra note 62, at
56; PHILIP SLATER, WEALTH ADDICTION 127 (1980) ("Using money as a motivator leads to a
progressive degradation in the quality of everything produced."); Edward L. Deci, The
Effects of Contingent and Noncontingent Rewards and Controls on Intrinsic Motivation, 8
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 217 (1972); Herbert H. Meyer, The Pay-
for-Performance Dilemma, 3 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 39, 41 (1974) (citing research of
Edward Deci demonstrating that if pay is directly attached to performance of a task, intrinsic
interest in the task declines).
66. See Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Inferred Values and the Reverse-Incentive Effect in
Induced Compliance, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 367 (1992) (suggesting that
when larger amounts of money are offered, people will infer that the activity is less
enjoyable, more difficult, or more dangerous).
67. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 76,78; HARRY LEVINSON, THE GREAT JACKASS FALLACY
10-11 (1973) (arguing that reward-punishment psychology assumes that the leader has
control and others are in a jackass position with respect to him, leading to decreased
productivity and other negative results); Skaggs et al., supra note 61, at 46 (suggesting that
when extrinsic rewards are provided for intrinsically motivating work, creativity,
spontaneity, and flexibility are decreased, and the employee may experience a loss of self-
determination and autonomy); Monique Jerome-Forget, Taking a Closer Look at Personal
Motivation, FIN. POST, Aug. 16, 1997, at 23 (describing psychological research finding that
"individuals perceive certain external interventions as controlling their behavior and react
by reducing their intrinsic motivation").
68. Commenting on the use of stock options among technology companies, a former
clinical and industrial psychologist recently bemoaned the change from doing something for
the love of it to just seeking to make a buck. See Bryant, supra note 26, § 4, at 1, 4.
69. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 49-50 (citing Dyer & Parker and criticizing Deci's
work on the grounds that intrinsic motivation is difficult to define or measure); FRANK J.
LANDY & DON A. TRUMBO, PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK BEHAVIOR 379 (1980) (noting that the
categorization of rewards as intrinsic or extrinsic does not add to investigations of effect of
rewards on behavior); Lee Dyer & Donald F. Parker, Classifying Outcomes in Work
Motivation Research: An Examination of the Intrinsic-Extrinsic Dichotomy, 60 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 455-58 (1975) (finding that it seems impossible to distinguish between intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards conceptually).
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motivation by reinforcing the internal drive.70
One concern expressed by those who believe that extrinsic rewards
negatively affect intrinsic motivation is that employees respond to reward
situations by doing only what it takes to receive the reward-they will not
take risks, they will not seek creative solutions to problems, and they will
simply work to achieve the award.71 As applied to executives, there has
been concern expressed that short-term incentive plans cause executives to
become too focused on only those measurements that serve as targets for
bonus awards.72 This argument does not say that rewards do not motivate;
rather, it says that they provide a distorted motivation.
It is hard to assess the concern about loss of intrinsic motivation in the
context of executive performance. Many of the studies discussing intrinsic
motivation and the loss occasioned by adding external reward use activities
70. See HENEmAN, supra note 3, at 49-50 (citing Scott, Farr & Podsakoff for the idea
that pay for performance does not always reduce intrinsic motivation); James L. Farr et al.,
Further Examinations of the Relationship Between Reward Contingency and Intrinsic
Motivation, 20 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HuM. PERFORMANCE 31-32 (1977)
(demonstrating that external rewards have either no effect on or increase intrinsic
motivation); Judith M. Harackiewicz & George Manderlink, A Process Analysis of the
Effects of Performance-Contingent Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531 (1984) (concluding that if an individual cares about doing well, intrinsic
motivation is increased by performance-contingent rewards); see also EDWIN A. LOCKE &
GARY P. LATHAM, A THEORY OF GOAL SETTING AND TASK PERFORMANCE 58 (1990)
(concluding that intrinsic motivation rarely operates in isolation from other types of
motivation in work settings, and that work life tends to be governed more by achievement
motivation and extrinsic motivation than by intrinsic motivation); Jim Braham, A
Rewarding Place to Work, INDusTRY WK., Sept. 18, 1989, at 15 (stating that money must be
present and in sufficient quantity in order for intrinsic rewards to motivate).
71. See CHAMPAGNE & MCAFEE, supra note 14, at 74 (linking objective measures to
rewards causes those measurable aspects to receive all the employee's attention, to the
neglect of other less measurable behaviors); MORF, supra note 62, at 56 (proposing that
extrinsic rewards contingent on performance can reduce intrinsic motivation and direct the
attention of employees exclusively to those things that clearly pay off); Gail D. Heyman &
Carol S. Dweck, Achievement Goals and Intrinsic Motivation: Their Relation and Their
Role in Adaptive Motivation, 16 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 231, 232 (1992) (stating that
individuals may avoid challenges, and make task choices that emphasize short-term success
at the expense of opportunities for future development); Robert H. Meehan, Why Merit
Increase Programs Fail, 8 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS MGMT. 46, 47 (1992) (citing
evidence that monetary rewards results in intrinsic rewards being "lost in the quest for
performance-rating scores and the dollar increase"); Meyer, supra note 48, at 41 (citing
research of Edward Deci that when pay becomes the important goal, the individual's interest
tends to focus on the goal rather than performance of the task).
72. See, e.g., Sumer C. Aggarwal & Sudhir Aggarwal, Compensation: A Management
Rewards System for the Long and Short Terms, 65 PERSONNEL J. 115, 116 (1986) ("[T]he
rewards must not only motivate managers towards desirable and company-oriented
behavior, but also promote a sense of responsibility towards sharing risks for the future.");
Alfie Kohn, Incentives Can Be Bad for Business, INC., Jan. 1988, at 93 (stating that rewards
discourage managers from taking risks and encourage narrow focus on accomplishing the
stated goal).
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such as game playing and reading that may be inherently pleasurable, so
that the intrusion of money into the activity may adversely impact the pure
pleasure. There is little, if anything, however, to suggest that corporate
management is so inherently pleasurable that people would engage in the
activity even if no paycheck were attached to it. Additionally, if executives
are, in fact, high on the acquisitiveness scale and start out looking for
money and the perquisites that money brings them (rather than being
interested in corporate management for its own sake), it is less likely that
closely associating pay and performance will have a significant adverse
effect on their intrinsic motivation to perform.
C. Reward As Punishment
Some researchers argue that reward functions as a form of
psychological punishment because of the added level of control it gives the
employer. This form of punishment can lead to defiance, defensiveness,
and rage.73 Rewards are said to punish in two respects. First, they control,
although by seduction, and thus feel punitive.74 Second, to many, a reward
withheld is the same as punishment. Thus, where people do not receive the
rewards they expect, the effect is indistinguishable from punishment.75 The
result is loss of self-esteem and a tendency to reevaluate the importance of
the activity for which the employee was insufficiently rewarded.
76
However, one should be hesitant about applying this notion to the
executive workforce, As one commentator has noted, "[tihe fair exchange
of money for goods and services is not the same as controlling through
rewards. 7 7 If the pay given to an executive represents a "fair and equitable
73. Kohn finds it interesting that many of the same people who reject punishment as a
form of behavior control embrace reward. For him, reward and punishment are two sides of
the same coin rather than opposites, in that both proceed from the same psychological
model, "one that conceives of motivation as nothing more than the manipulation of
behavior." KOHN, supra note 1, at 51.
74. See id. But see CHAMPAGNE & MCAFEE, supra note 14, at 34 (stating the
behaviorist counter to this argument that all management programs are manipulative in
some way and that making individuals "aware of the consequences provides them with an
opportunity to make explicit choices between well-defined alternatives").
75. See generally KOHN, supra note 1, at 50-52; CHAMPAGNE & MCAFEE, supra note
14, at 22-23 (stating that punishment involves either taking direct punitive action or
withholding a reward); Meyer, supra note 48, at 42 (describing how merit pay plans have
the effect of threatening the self-esteem of a majority of workers because they may not
receive the reward they feel their performance justifies).
76. See Meyer, supra note 48, at 44; David J. McLaughlin, Does Compensation
Motivate Executives?, in ExEcUTrVE COMPENSATON: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990S
59, 76 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (stating that executive overcompensation can demoralize
the individual as well as the entire work force).
77. Richard B. Polley, Punished by Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive
Plans, A's, Praise and Other Bribes (Book Review), Soc., July, 1995, at 92, 93 (reviewing
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exchange for the service,"' there is no control or manipulation in the
payment. Thus, to the extent that this notion has any applicability to the
issue of the use of pay to motivate executives, it is merely to suggest that it
is important to ensure that executives understand the link between
performance and pay and that the link is not manipulated in such a manner
that executives believe they are being deprived of their due compensation,
especially by factors beyond their control. It thus has the same
implications as the equity theory, described below.
79
The foregoing arguments are certainly not enough to cause us to
jettison the notion of trying to tie pay to performance. At a minimum,
companies must have some way of allocating compensation and pay
increases. Attempting to make compensation decisions that will positively
affect performance is preferable to other alternatives, ° assuming, of course,
that performance can be defined and accurately measured.81 In addition, it
would appear from the evidence that money has the capacity to act as an
effective motivator at least in some circumstances. The question is what do
theories of motivation teach us about how to best structure contingent
compensation arrangements.
III. A MIDDLE GROUND: THEORIES OF MOTIVATION AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR ExEcuTIVE COMPENSATION PACKAGES
The use of performance-based compensation is premised on the
acceptance of the notion that money can be an effective motivator. The
question is how to best structure such plans to maximize their motivational
impact. This section attempts to answer that question by examining
psychological theories of motivation. Section A discusses several
ALFIE KOHN, THE TRouBLE wiTH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE PLANS, A's, PRAISE AND OTHER
BRBES (1993)). Not all commentators agree with Kohn's notion that incentive pay in the
workplace is necessarily controlling. See id.
78. Id.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 117-126.
80. One author suggests that there are three approaches to how organizations distribute
resources to employees: (1) nepotism and favoritism, (2) across-the-board distributions, and
(3) merit allocations. See Richard E. Kopelman, Organizational Control System
Responsiveness, Expectancy Theory Constructs, and Work Motivation: Some Interrelations
and Causal Connections, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 205 (1976). Of course, there may be
other aims sought to be achieved by compensation decisions, such as attracting and retaining
employees and preventing or solving labor disputes.
8 1. Most commentators agree that if performance cannot be clearly measured, it is best
not to give extrinsic rewards. See, e.g., CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 74
(stating that extrinsic rewards cannot and should not be used to motivate job performance in
jobs where there are no objective measures for performance); Linden & Contavespi, supra
note 47, at 212 (quoting W. Edwards Deming to the effect that performance cannot be
measured, meaning that merit pay merely rewards circumstances).
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psychological theories of motivation and sketches their general
implications for compensation decision making.12  These theories all
accept, at least to some degree, the notion that money acts as a motivator."
Section B then discusses the applications of motivation theory to
contingent compensation as it is currently structured and practiced.
A. Theories of Motivation
1. Reinforcement Theory
Reinforcement theory is based on the work of B.F. Skinner, 4 although
a number of other authors have extended his theory from the laboratory
setting to the workplace.15 The thrust of the reinforcement theory is that the
frequency of a desired behavior "is likely to be increased when a valued
reward is made contingent upon that behavior. 86  The theory also
postulates that "the contingency between behavior and rewards is likely to
be strengthened the more clearly the behavior is defined, the closer in time
the reward is to the behavior, and the closer in magnitude the reward is to
the behavior."87
The available research applying a generalized money reinforcement
theory to the workplace suggests that it may be of limited value in the
82. Since my focus is on the ability of compensation to motivate executives, I am
focusing on those psychological theories of motivation that would seem to have implications
specifically for the use of pay. Thus, for example, I do not discuss certain psychological
theories that may be of general interest in structuring a workplace environment to increase
worker motivation but that do not necessarily have implications for compensation. See, e.g.,
LANDY & TRUMBO, supra note 69, at 336-43 (describing Maslow's Need Hierarchy Theory
and Alderfer's ERG Theory).
83. This assumption is important for non-psychological theories of behavior as well. If
we were speaking about economic theories of rational utility maximization or rational
choice, we would still require the assumption that the decision maker valued money in order
for certain rational decisions to be made to facilitate attainment of money. See LEVINSON,
supra note 67, at 22-23 (describing economic model of man); DOUGLAS MCGREGOR, THE
HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE (1960) (taking the view that most people work for pay); EDGAR
H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1972) (developing the rational-economic model
of man, which assumes that economic gain is the greatest motivator of human behavior).
84. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCEAND HUMAN BEHAvIOR (1953).
85. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 28 (citing those authors who have built on the work
of Skinner); LANDY & TRuMBO, supra note 69, at 352-55 (discussing research showing that
individuals rewarded for successful job performance produce more than those not
rewarded).
86. HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 28.
87. Id; see also CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 35 (stating that successful
reinforcement programs are set up so that rewards are directly related to specific behaviors
and are given without delay after the desired behavior).
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context of executive compensation."8 Although the evidence suggests that
performance improves when the principles of reinforcement theory are
followed, for the most part the studies consider short-term rather than long-
term effects. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, they use simple
measures of performance, such as quantity of output, rather than measuring
activities and decision-making processes more characteristic of executive
performance. s9
Nonetheless, reinforcement theory appears to have some basic
implications for designing contingent pay for executives. It suggests that
(1) the performance sought must be clearly defined; (2) pay increases must
be contingent only upon performance to condition the appropriate behavior;
(3) the size of pay increases should correlate to levels of performance; and
(4) the contingent reward needs to be close in time to the desired
performance. 90
More valuable than reinforcement theory to the issue of executive
compensation are the following three psychological theories.
2. Goal-Setting Theory
Goal-setting theory developed in the mid-1960s as an alternative
approach to the studies of motivation that were then dominant, such as
reinforcement theory.91 One of the early formulators of the theory was
Edwin A. Locke.92 Since his formulation, the theory has become "one of
88. See LANDY & TRUMBO, supra note 69, at 355 ("While we accept the basic
proposition that contingent rewards affect behavior, we are not convinced that the
behaviorist model can be usefully applied in any meaningful sense to a wide range of work
behavior."); MURTHY, supra note 51, at 25 (noting that experimental evidence for a
monetary reinforcement theory is considered limited and inconclusive); Gary W. Heiman, A
Note on Operant Conditioning Principles Extrapolated to the Theory of Management, 13
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 165, 168 (1975).
89. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 29; see also LANDY & TRUMBO, supra note 69, at
362-63 (describing problems of applying behaviorism in the workplace); Edwin A. Locke,
Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives, 3 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 157 (1968).
90. Heneman discusses these implications in the context of merit pay generally. See
HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 29.
91. See Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham, Goal Setting Theory, in MOTIVATION:
THEORY AND RESEARCH 13, 14 (Harold F. O'Neil, Jr. & Michael Drillings eds., 1994). Goal
setting represents a reaction to the fact that "[a]ll-encompassing theories of motivation based
on such concepts as instinct, drive, and conditioning have not succeeded in explaining
human action." Edwin A. Locke et al., Goal Setting and Task Performance: 1969-1980, 90
PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 125 (1981) (describing goal setting as falling within the broad domain
of cognitive psychology and being consistent with trends such as cognitive behavior
modification).
92. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 33; Locke, supra note 89, at 157. Locke states that
"[o]ther than the core premise, there was no network of theoretical propositions that could
formally be called goal theory until my 1990 book with Latham, although most components
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the most thoroughly researched areas in the management and
organizational behavior literatures. 93
Locke's theory of goal setting addresses the relationship between
goals, "goal" being defined as what an individual consciously sets out to
do, and performance. The theory postulates that an individual's actions are
regulated by his or her conscious intentions, or "goals". 94
According to goal-setting theory, goals motivate individuals when the
goals are specific, challenging, and are accepted by the individual.9
"[H]ard goals result in a higher level of performance than do easy goals,
and specific hard goals result in a higher level of performance than do no
goals or a generalized goal of 'do your best."' 96  There has been a
tremendous volume of research supporting goal-setting theory. Goal
specificity, difficulty, and acceptance have all been demonstrated to relate
to performance.97
The evidence is particularly strong regarding the importance of goal
specificity and the level of difficulty. According to Locke and Latham,
there have been over 400 studies that have examined the relationship of
difficulty and specificity to performance. They have consistently found
that the harder the goal the better the performance, and that specific and
difficult goals produce higher performance than goals that are vague but
challenging.98 Other researchers reviewing the literature have reached the
same conclusion.9 9 Difficulty appears to be important because people
of the theory had appeared in earlier writings." Edwin A. Locke, Goal Theory v. Control
Theory: Contrasting Approaches to Understanding Work Motivation, 15 MOTIVATION &
EMOTION 9, 19 (1991).
93. Anthony J. Mento et al., A Meta-Analytic Study of the Effects of Goal Setting on
Task Performance: 1966-1984, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DEcIsION PROCESSES
52, 74 (1987).
94. See Gary P. Latham & Gary A. Yuld, A Review of Research on the Application of
Goal Setting in Organizations, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 824, 824 (1975); Locke & Latham.,
supranote 91, at 126.
Locke's early work treated goal and intention as interchangeable concepts. See
Locke, supra note 89, at 158-59; see also Locke & Latham et al., supra note 91, at 125.
Later, Locke and Latham distinguished goal from intention; goal representing the object of
actions and intention representing planned actions. See Mark E. Tubbs & Steven E.
Ekeberg, The Role of Intentions in Work Motivation: Implications for Goal-Setting Theory
and Research, 16 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 180, 181 (1991) (suggesting that one's intentions,
defined as "a cognitive representation of both the objective (goal) one is striving to reach
and an action plan one intends to use to reach that objective," is separate and distinct from
one's goal).
95. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 33; Latham & Yukl, supra note 94, at 824.
96. Latham & Yukl, supra note 94, at 840 (finding strong support for Locke's
propositions that "specific goals increase performance and that difficult goals, if accepted,
result in better performance than do easy goals").
97. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 34 (citing Mento and Tubbs).
98. See Locke & Latham, supra note 91, at 15-16.
99. See, e.g., Latham & Yukl, supra note 94, at 829-30 (reporting on studies evaluating
1999] MOTIVATING ExEcuTivES 253
adjust their efforts to the difficulty of the task. Specificity is key because
vague goals are compatible with many different outcomes including less
than optimal performance,' ° whereas specific goals impose structure and
reduce distraction. TM Regardless of the reasons, "[i]f there is ever to be a
viable candidate from the organizational sciences for elevation to the lofty
status of a scientific law of nature, then the relationship between goal
difficulty, specificity/difficulty, and task performance are most worthy of
serious consideration."'0 2
The link between goal-setting theory and compensation comes at the
level of goal commitment. Commitment refers to the "degree to which an
individual is attracted to the goal, considers it important, is determined to
goal specificity and finding virtually all to support the importance of specificity); Locke &
Latham, supra note 91, at 131 (reviewing literature since 1968 and finding that overall 48
studies partly or wholly support the hypothesis that hard goals lead to better performance
and that 51 partly or wholly support hypotheses regarding importance of specific goals);
Mento et al., supra note 93, at 75 (concluding from their meta-analytic study involving
published research conducted from 1966 to 1984 that goal difficulty and specificity are
consistently related to performance); Mark E. Tubbs, Goal Setting: A Meta-Analytic
Examination of the Empirical Evidence, 71 . APPLIED PSYCHOL. 474, 479 (1986) (reaching
a conclusion from his meta-analytic study of the empirical evidence that supported Locke's
goal setting theory).
100. See Locke & Latham, supra note 91, at 15-16. See generally Anthony J. Mento et
al., Relationship of Goal Level to Valence and Instrumentality, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 395
(1992) (suggesting that the ambiguity inherent in vague goals allows people to give
themselves the benefit of the doubt in evaluating their performance).
101. See CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 92 ("Increasing goal specificity on a
task reduces role ambiguity and narrows the search for acceptable behaviors .... People
told to do their best do not really know what to do at all."); MORF, supra note 62, at 53.
102. Mento et al., supra note 93, at 74. Tubbs suggests that "there appears to be little
need to continue conducting studies solely concerned with testing the effects of goal
difficulty and goal specificity on performance. A large number of such studies have already
been done, and although there has been variation in the findings, the effects are generally
positive across the different types of studies." Tubbs, supra note 99, at 480. But see
Heyman & Dweck, supra note 71, at 241 (suggesting that although learning goals generally
enhance intrinsic motivation, performance goals undermine intrinsic motivation).
While there is consensus about goal difficulty and goal specificity, there is less
agreement about other aspects of goal setting theory. For example, many researchers
disagree about the value of participatively set versus assigned goals. See, e.g., CHAMPAGNE
& McAFEE, supra note 14, at 93-95 (suggesting that research is mixed on whether or not
employee participation in setting goals has a positive effect and that participation in goal
setting might be useful only if it results in more difficult goals being established); Latham &
Yukl, supra note 94, at 840 (stating that results as to assigned versus participative goals are
not consistent); Locke & Latham, supra note 91, at 16-17 (suggesting controversy in
literature concerning the effectiveness of assigned versus participatively set goals and
concluding that assigned goals with rationale are as motivating as participatively set goals).
Some have suggested that even if participation is not important in terms of performance, it
does affect job satisfaction. See Lowery et al., supra note 3, at 26 (suggesting that a
frequent employee complaints about performance-based compensation demonstrates lack of
control or involvement in the plan and that employee perception of being left out of the
process negatively affects job satisfaction).
254 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:2
attain it, and sticks with it in the face of obstacles."' 3 Several researchers
have suggested that money is a factor that plays a role in affecting an
individual's degree of goal commitment. They argue that contingent pay
may create greater commitment to a goal.' °4 In evaluating this idea, it is
important to keep in mind that another factor affecting goal commitment is
the belief that achieving the specified goals is possible.10 5 Therefore, under
goal-setting theory individual motivation suffers if goals are set at too low
a level of difficulty, or if they appear so difficult as to be unreachable. 0 6
Feedback may be a second link between goal-setting theory and
compensation. Feedback entails providing knowledge of the results of
performance. Goal theorists generally discuss the importance of feedback,
and the research seems to indicate that feedback has a positive impact on
performance, even independent of goal setting.'07 While goal setting alone
103. Locke & Latham, supra note 91, at 16.
104. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 33-34 (noting that pay incentives contribute to the
motivational effect of goal setting by creating greater commitment to the goal); MORF,
supra note 62, at 53 (proposing that once a goal has been accepted, money can increase the
valence of attaining it and therefore increase commitment to the goal); Latham & Yukl,
supra note 94, at 837 (stating that monetary incentives are more likely to increase goal
acceptance and commitment than to induce a person to set a higher goal); Locke & Latham,
supra note 91, at 136-37 (suggesting that money can affect task performance independently
of goal level).
105. See CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 91 ("Goals should cause people to
exert themselves, but the outcomes must still be within their grasp."); Locke & Latham,
supra note 91, at 17; Edwin A. Locke, Relation of Goal Level to Performance with a Short
Work Period and Multiple Goal Levels, 67 . APPLIED PSYCHOL. 512, 513-14 (1982) (finding
that performance decreases when success seems impossible); Edwin A. Locke & Gary P.
Latham, Work Motivation and Satisfaction: Light at the End of the Tunnel, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI.
240, 240 (1990) [hereinafter Work Motivation and Satisfaction] ("Monetary incentives
strengthen goal commitment providing people value money, the amount of money is
sufficiently large and the incentives are not tied to goals perceived as impossible.").
106. See Locke & Latham, supra note 91, at 17 (citing research of Lee, O'Neil, Locke,
and Phan).
It has been found consistently that performance is linearly related to goal level.
Given sufficient ability and high commitment to the goal, the harder the goal the
better the performance .... Goal theory predicts and finds a performance drop
at high goal difficulty levels only if there is a large decrease in goal
commitment (or a poor task strategy was used). Performance levels out, of
course, when the limits of ability are reached.
Id. at 15.
107. See, e.g., MoRF, supra note 62, at 52 (discussing how goals facilitate feedback and
feedback is reinforcing of performance); John M. Ivancevick & J. Timothy McMahon, The
Effects of Goal Setting, External Feedback, and Self-Generated Feedback on Outcome
Variables: A Field Experiment, 24 ACAD. MGMT. 1. 359 (1982) (proposing that goal-setting
has greater effect on motivation when accompanied by feedback); Jay S. Kim & W. Clay
Hamner, Effect of Performance Feedback and Goal Setting on Productivity and Satisfaction
in an Organizational Setting, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 48, 55 (1976) (reporting own study
results that feedback enhances performance beyond what would be achieved by goal setting
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enhances performance, performance is enhanced even more when feedback
is provided. Contingent compensation provides a form of feedback, since
the executive's pay provides a measure of his attainment of the established
goals.
Goal-setting theory would thus appear to have three basic implications
for designing contingent pay for executives: (1) compensation should be
made contingent upon specific and understandable' 8  goals; (2)
compensation should be made contingent upon goals that are difficult, but
not so difficult that they are perceived as unattainable; and (3)
compensation should be structured to provide meaningful feedback to
executives.
3. Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory as a formal model was first developed by Vroom1 °9
in 1964 and has been refined by many others since then." The theory
postulates that an individual's motivation is a function of three types or sets
of perceptions: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. Expectancy
refers to an individual's perception that changes in individual effort will
lead to changes in performance. Instrumentality refers to the individual's
belief that performance will lead to certain rewards or outcomes. Valence
alone); see also CHAMNPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 94 (noting that most research
suggests that knowledge of results is effective only if it is related to the accomplishment of
specific goals, and that general praise has no discernable effect on behavior). Some would
go further, arguing that goal setting without feedback has little long term effect on
performance. See Work Motivation and Satisfaction, supra note 105, at 241.
108. Goals fall to motivate if people do not understand the link between goal and reward.
See CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 91 (stating that goals lose their motivating
potential when the relationship between an individual's performance and the rewards is not
understood). But see John C. Mowen et al., Joint Effects of Assigned Goal Level and
Incentive Structure on Task Performance: A Laboratory Study, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 598,
602 (1981) (rejecting the argument that a lack of understanding of the link between
performance and compensation under a complex bonus incentive system resulted lower
performance for difficult goals).
109. See generally VICTOR H. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION (1964). There were,
however, precursors to Vroom's model. One was the "path-goal" instrumentality theory of
Georgopolous, Mahoney and Jones enunciated in 1967. See LANDY & TRtmJo, supra note
69, at 343. Others mentioned as precursers to Vroom are Atkinson and Lewin. See
generally John W. Atkinson, Towards Experimental Analysis of Human Motivation in
Terms of Motives, Expectancies, and Incentives, in JOHN W. ATKINSON, MOTIVES IN
FANTASY, ACTION AND SOCIETY (David C McClelland ed., 1958); Kurt Lewin, Psychology
of Success and Failure, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN MOTIVATION 317 (Chalmers L. Stacey
& Manfred F. DeMartino eds., 1958).
110. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 24-25 (citing Porter and Lawler as among those who
have refined Vroom's notions); LANDY & TRUMBO, supra note 69, at 344-47 (discussing
Porter and Lawler's model as well as later research on expectancy theory). See generally
LAWLER, supra note 55.
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refers to the attractiveness of the rewards or outcomes that will result from
the performance.' In lay terms, the theory can be expressed in the form of
three questions: (1) Can I do it?; (2) What will I get?; (3) How much do I
want what I can get?112  The answers to these questions ultimately
determine productivity.
In basic terms, the theory states that the greater the valence of
outcomes and the higher the instrumentality and expectancy perceptions,
the greater the individual's effort.' Like goal-setting theory, there has
been a tremendous amount of research done on expectancy theory that
supports the major components of the theory.
14
When pay is the outcome in question, expectancy theory states that
pay will have a high motivational force when compensation has a high
valence, is perceived to be dependent on high performance, and increases
in the individual's effort level are perceived to lead to greater
compensation. As with goal setting, an individual who believes that she
can successfully complete a task is more likely to be motivated to try it
than one who does not believe the task can be successfully completed."
5
Expectancy theory has several implications for structuring contingent
compensation arrangements. The theory suggests that (1) for contingent
compensation to be an effective motivator, increased pay must be more
attractive (i.e., have a greater positive valence) than other outcomes (such
as increased leisure time, etc.); (2) executives must perceive performance
as being instrumental in attaining the desired outcome, which means that
111. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 25; MORF, supra note 62, at 44; Edward E. Lawler,
II, Job Design and Employee Motivation, in MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVAnON, supra note
14, at 160, 160-61.
112. See CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 60.
113. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that the three perceptions combine in a
multiplicative manner, such that if any of expectancy, instrumentality or valence has a value
of zero, motivational force will be zero); Lawler, supra note 111, at 160-61 (noting that the
factors combine multiplicatively). Thus, there will be no motivation if (1) people do not
believe they will succeed; (2) they do not think that performing well will be adequately
rewarded; or (3) they do not want the rewards offered. See CHAMPAGNE & MCAFEE, supra
note 14, at 63. Expectancy theory might appear to contradict goal setting, since it postulates
that "effort-performance expectancy drops as goal difficulty rises." MoRF, supra note 62, at
53. However, "the lowered effort-performance expectancy is typically more than
counterbalanced by the higher valence of more challenging goals." Id. (citing Matsui, Okada
& Mizuguchi).
114. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 26-27. See, e.g., Richard E. Kopelman,
Organizational Control System Responsiveness, Expectancy Theory Constructs, and Work
Motivation: Some Interrelations and Causal Connections, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 205,
205-06 (1976) (describing his own work and citing several other authors and studies
supporting expectancy theory).
115. See CHAMPAGNE & McAFEE, supra note 14, at 61; MoF, supra note 62, at 44. See
generally J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, 2 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 267 (1965).
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the relationship between pay and performance must be clearly defined,
1 6
and pay should not depend on factors other than performance; (3)
executives must believe that performance can be accurately measured; and
(4) executives must perceive a relationship between their own actions and
the performance measures that result in increased compensation.
4. Equity Theory
Equity theory, articulated by researchers such as J.S. Adams117 and
Edward E. Lawler,"' posits that motivation is affected not only by a
person's own compensation and the relationship between that person's pay
and performance, but also by the pay of others (and by the relationship
between their pay and performance). 19
Equity theory rests on the fundamental notion that people want to be
treated fairly. It posits that individuals establish a relationship between
their inputs (what they contribute in their work setting), and their outputs
(what they receive for their input). Since individuals' notions of what is
equitable derives from comparing their reward with others' rewards, they
analyze the relationship between their own inputs and outputs in light of
the correlative relationship of a similar group of people whom they believe
should be rewarded comparably. If they receive too much in relation to the
comparison group they feel uncomfortable, guilty, or embarrassed, and if
they receive too little they feel resentful and disgruntled. In either case,
their work output and quality are adversely affected.2 "Equity theory
116. See Kopelman, supra note 114, at 205-06 (suggesting that this is the most widely
cited implication of expectancy theory); Opsahl & Dunnette, supra note 40, at 138
(suggesting that the effectiveness of incentive plans in general depends on the individual's
knowledge of the relation between performance and pay).
117. See Adams, supra note 115, at 267.
118. LAWLER, supra note 55, at 17-18.
119. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 30-31 (discussing the theory and citing those who
have articulated it); see also MORF, supra note 62, at 23 (assuming that in area of work
motivation, perceived outcomes and rewards are more important than objective outcome of
work performance). Equity theory is a variation of the balance theory which holds that
"behavior is initiated, directed, and sustained by the attempts of the individual to maintain
some internal balance of psychological tension." LANDY & TRUMBo, supra note 69, at 355-
56. The theory, as applied to the workplace, as based on Festinger's theory of cognitive
dissonance, essentially posits that because tension is unpleasant, individuals act to reduce
the tensions created by discrepant cognitions. See id.
120. See LAWLER, supra note 55, at 17; VROOM & DECI, supra note 14, at 96-97; Stuart
C. Can et al., Effects of Unreasonable Pay Discrepancies for Under- and Overpayment on
Double Demotivation, 122 GENETIC, SOC., & GEN. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 477 (1996)
(finding that pay discrepancies decreased work motivation and job satisfaction, and
produced greater readiness to change jobs). But see Richard C. Huseman et al., A New
Perspective on Equity Theory: The Equity Sensitivity Construct, 12 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 222,
231 (1987) (proposing that individuals are not equally sensitive to equity in that
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states that the presence of inequity will motivate an individual to reduce
inequity and that the strength of the motivation to reduce inequity varies
directly with the perceived magnitude of the imbalance experienced
between inputs and outcomes.' 21 The likely result of a perception that one
is paid less than she deserves is that the employee will achieve balance by
reducing her own productivity. 122 Even for employees for whom money
itself is not the most important factor in their employment, fairness in pay
does assume importance.123
For purposes of equity theory, individuals may compare themselves to
others inside or outside the work organization. 24 In the case of executives,
it is particularly likely that the comparison will-be external. This is true not
only because a CEO is not really comparable to anyone else within an
organization, but also because information about the compensation of
senior executives at public companies is so readily available that executives
cannot help but compare their own compensation to others in similar
"Benevolents prefer that their outcome/input ratio be less than the comparison other's;
Equity Sensitives, who adhere to a norm of equity, prefer balanced outcome/input ratios;
and Entitleds prefer that their outcome/input ratios exceed the comparison other's."); David
I. Levine, What do Wages Buy?, 38 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 462, 463, 481 (1993) (finding that
culture makes a difference; noting that Japanese workers experienced lowered morale and
commitment about over-payment than their counterparts in the United States; "it is
considered bad form in Japan to be an overachiever .... This ideology is reflected in the
classic Japanese proverb: 'The nail that sticks out gets hammered down."') (internal
citations omitted).
121. LAWLER, supra note 55, at 18; see also Bonnie R. Rabin, Executive Compensation
and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis 47-48 (Library of the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University) (1987) (discussing Adams
equity theory).
122. See LAWLER, supra note 55, at 18; J. Stacy Adams & William B. Rosenbaum, The
Relationship of Worker Productivity to Cognitive Dissonance About Wage Inequities, 46 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 161, 163 (1962) (finding that lower paid workers decrease productivity
to restore equity); Melvin M. Mark & Jerald Greenberg, Evening the Score, PsYcHOL.
TODAY, Jan. 1987, at 44 (citing sports examples in support of notion that when people do
not get rewards they believe they deserve, they try to restore equity by decreasing their
performance levels).
Another response to disparity is to withdraw from the situation-either by leaving or
absenteeism. See D.R. Schmitt & G. Marwell, Withdrawal and Reward Allocation as
Responses to Inequity, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 207, 219 (1972).
123. See CRYSTAL, supra note 51, at 15 ("[Clompanies that are able to maintain
significant compensation differentials between outstanding and mediocre performers seem
to have less trouble in keeping executive talent over the short term-even when their overall
compensation posture is below average-than companies whose compensation practices are
above average but who consistently fall to provide the proper degree of performance
recognition."); O'Heir, supra note 49, at 135 (tying pay to performance and stating that fair
performance measures are of greater importance than pay itself for non-executive high tech
company employees).
124. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 30. See also Aggarwal & Aggarwal, supra note 72,
at 116 (noting that information from national executive pay surveys have formed the basis
of management rewards rather than performance or job contributions).
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positions in other organizations.
Although the studies on equity theory have mixed results,1 5
employees asked about their reaction to the adoption of performance-based
compensation arrangements frequently express concerns about fairness of
the allocation of rewards. 6 Indeed, it is almost a common sense notion
that a participant's perception of the fairness of a performance-based
compensation plan is important.
Equity theory has two implications for contingent pay plans. It
implies both that: (1) the relationship between pay and performance must
be clearly specified and clearly communicated so as to diminish the
difference between the perceived relationship between pay and
performance and the actual relationship; and (2) attention must be paid to
the relationship between the pay of an executive and the pay of similarly
situated executives both within the organization and among the
organization's industry peer group.
B. Application of Motivation Theories to Executive Compensation
Packages
The preceding section suggests that the various theories of motivation
have much to say about how contingent compensation arrangements can
best be structured. Although there may be some tension between the
theories at certain levels-for example, between reinforcement theory's
insistence that pay increases be contingent only on performance and equity
theory's notion that the pay of other similarly situated individuals must be
considered as well-there are some common themes as well. 27 Once we
accept the fundamental notion that money may serve as a motivator, it
would appear that in order for contingent compensation plans to maximize
their motivating effect, at a minimum, the plans should meet several
criteria.
125. See HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 32; LANDY & TRuMBo, supra note 69, at 356-57.
126. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get
Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 ViLE. L. REv.
273, 290-91 (1992) (noting that employees do not look favorably upon compensation plans
because of managers' inability to evaluate employees and because employees feel that
managers do not have the ability to distinguish among the performances rendered by the
employees they are evaluating); Lowery et al., supra note 3, at 26 (surveying employees at
seven companies adopting performance-based plans suggests that employees were
concerned with lack of fairness or perception of favoritism in award allocations).
127. I say "may be" a tension because, depending on how one defines performance, it
may be possible to make the two theories consistent. However, to the extent tension exists,
it is equity theory's conclusion that will win out, since as a matter not only of equity theory,
but also of the need to retain executives, boards will always consider the pay of other
executives (both within and without) the organization in deciding what to pay their senior
officers, particularly the CEO.
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First, the goals established for executives to receive certain pay
increases must be sufficiently difficult, although not so difficult as to be
unattainable (or to be perceived as unattainable). In addition, there should
be some specificity to the goals. Goal difficulty is important to both goal-
setting theory (which finds performance to be linearly related to goal
level) 12 and expectancy theory (which posits that more challenging goals
are more attractive). 29
Second, there must be some relationship between the individuals'
performances and attainment of the goals on which pay is based. For
example, if short-term incentive plans provide for bonuses to be paid upon
the attainment of certain corporate targets, the individual has to perceive
that superior performance on her part will affect whether the corporation
achieves those targets.
Third, the relationship between pay and performance should be clearly
specified. Under all of the theories, particularly expectancy theory, the
individual must understand the relation between performance and pay."3
Finally, pay must actually depend on performance. It must be ensured
that executives do not sense that the contingent pay arrangements can be
manipulated in such a way that the executives are either cheated of
compensation they deserve or paid in excess of what their performance
warrants. Although this requirement is most important for equity theory, it
is clearly implicated in the other theories as well.'
3'
Current contingent compensation arrangements do not measure up to
these teachings of motivation theory. As currently structured and
implemented, performance-based compensation does not serve as a
sufficient motivator of executive performance. The reasons for this include
high base salaries, the failure to distinguish between individual and group
performance, insufficiently high performance barriers, and manipulative
behavior.
1. High Base Salary
Despite the increasing use of various forms of contingent
compensation, the base salary of most executives remains quite high. A
quick glance at the 1998 Wall Street Journal survey of executive pay
shows many executives with 1997 base salaries in excess of $1 million
32
128. See supra note 106 and text accompanying notes 94-101.
129. See supra note 113.
130. See supra note 116.
131. As discussed earlier, feedback affects goal commitment which is important to goal-
setting theory. If pay does not in fact depend on performance, the feedback effect of pay
regarding past performance is distorted.
132. See The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R13.
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(despite section 162(m) of the Code, which disallows deductions for
compensation in excess of $1 million that is not performance-based133), and
many more with base salaries in the $600,000 to $900,000 range.
34
Any attempt to motivate through compensation 135 is doomed to fail if a
substantial portion of an executive's pay is fixed at a high level.
36
Guaranteeing a high base salary is inconsistent with the underpinnings of
the expectancy theory because the fact that a significant portion of income
is independent of performance levels weakens the executive's
instrumentality perceptions, including her belief that performance will
affect the outcome or attainment of reward.1 37 As one former consultant
quipped, "[e]ven if the rest of the CEO's pay package were fraught with
risk, which it is not, how can a CEO talk about taking risk and at the same
time keep a straight face when, if the worst happens, he is down to his last
$1 million per year?"' 3 Even taking into account the fact that executives
are likely to be overachievers for whom lots of money is important both as
a symbol of achievement and as a necessity in maintaining a certain
lifestyle, base salary is high enough to call into question the motivational
impact of the contingent portion.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
134. See The Boss's Pay, supra note 132; see also John W. Hunt, Profits, Pay and Team
Work, FIN. TIMEs, July 15, 1998, at 16 (stating that "research has shown that, at best, only
about 5% of chief executives' pay depends upon the company's performance").
135. Companies may pay some executives high base salaries for reasons unrelated to an
attempt to motivate the executives. For example, it might be thought necessary to pay an
executive a high base salary to attract the executive or to retain her during bad economic
times. The purpose of this article is not to debate the wisdom of those other goals, or to
balance them against the desire to motivate. Rather, it is to suggest that if the compensation
goal is to motivate executives, paying a high base salary makes it harder to achieve that
goal.
136. Bonnie R. Rabin analyzed employment agreements for use in her thesis and found
support for this conclusion. See Rabin, supra note 121. Ms. Rabin conducted a multiple
regression analysis for a cross-sectional time series sample of 255 manufacturing firms and
found that the use of executive employment agreements "is associated with a statistically
significant adverse effect on subsequent financial performance." Id. at 3. The overall
characteristics of the employment agreements studied included guaranteed levels of
compensation independent of firm performance, a guarantee of a fixed period of
employment, and takeover protections which are fairly typical in executive employment
agreements. See id. at 13. More importantly, in terms of the results, salary was typically the
largest single component of executive pay. See id. Ms. Rabin's conclusions suggest that it
is meaningless to speak of motivating executives through contingent compensation so long
as the executives continue to receive such large base salaries.
137. See id. at 41.
138. CRYSTAL, supra note 26, at 175. For example, Lee R. Raymond, CEO of Exxon,
received 200,000 stock options as part of his 1994 compensation. However, the incentive
impact of this receipt is extremely limited given that he also received a $1.3 million base
salary and a restricted stock grant of $593,000. See Jack L. Lederer & Carl R. Weinberg,
Harnessing Corporate Horsepower: The New Principles of CEO Compensation, CHIEF
ExEcuTvE, Sept. 1, 1995, at 32.
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On the other hand, there may be a downside to making too high a
percentage of the executive's compensation contingent. The concern is not
so much that a bad year for the company might result in low pay for that
year,139 but that the prospect of a low payoff may cause an executive to
make decisions adverse to shareholders' interests. For example, if too large
a portion of an executive's pay is based on stock performance, the
executive may be less willing to undertake risky actions which might be in
the best interests of shareholders in the long-run, but that may adversely
affect the stock's price in the short-term. 14  This possibility is aggravated
because, unlike a shareholder, who normally purchases a company's stock
as part of a diverse stock portfolio, contingent compensation arrangements
based on company stock may result in an executive having a very high
percentage of her total investment capital tied up in company stock.1
4'
Determining what portion of an executive's compensation should be
contingent to maximize motivation and improve performance requires a
delicate balance. Contingent compensation must be high enough to make a
real difference to an executive. However, it cannot be so high as to have an
adverse effect on executive decision-making or on the executive's desire to
undertake the challenge.
2. Failure to Distinguish Between Individual and Group
Performance
For pay to motivate performance, individual performance must have a
significant effect on pay. However, current forms of contingent
compensation do not place sufficient weight on individual performance.
Short-term incentive plans typically set target awards as a percentage
of salary. Generally, the largest portion of the award is based on the
achievement of certain corporate goals and a small amount is based on
142individual performance. The amount of the reward dependent on
139. Many workers are dependent on contingent pay for the bulk of their earnings.
Obvious examples are salespersons paid primarily on commission and brokers, who
generally have a low base salary and are paid very high bonuses dependent upon their
performance. Such persons work with the understanding that their pay may be low in any
given year and high in others.
140. It is not clear that the threat of takeover or of termination by shareholders would be
sufficient to counter the adverse effect on decision making.
141. However, executives may always make use of the derivatives market to diversify
their investment risk. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
142. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ExEcuTIVE COMPENSATION
44 (1984) (noting that although most companies claim they take individual performance into
account in determining executive bonus awards, individual performance usually does not
count for all that much); Aggarwal & Aggarwal, supra note 72, at 115 (reporting that most
companies tie executive raises and bonuses to annual profit level).
For example, a plan might provide that achievement of certain corporate goals yields a
MOTIVATING ExEcuTIvEs
individual performance is simply too small to have an effect.
143
Long-term incentive plans pose a similar problem. "Many companies
do not even make an effort to adjust awards on the basis of individual
performance. They simply grant all executives in the same salary grade (or
title/functional level) the exact same number of stock options, performance
units, or whatever."' 44 Because the number of shares granted bears little
relation to individual performance, an executive will not be personally
motivated to try to affect the number of shares she will receive.
Moreover, after a stock-based form of compensation such as a stock
option is granted, there is often no adjustment for individual performance.
The actual size of each individual's award is based on the increase in the
company's stock price, and is not directly dependent upon the individual's
performance.145 If two executives each receive 50,000 options and one
works diligently, but the other does not, when the price of the company's
stock rises by two dollars per share, each will receive $100,000 in
compensation. This result has negative implications under both equity
theory (because one or both executives will feel that she is not being paid
equitably in comparison to the another) and expectancy theory (since the
instrumentality perception is being distorted).
This problem is not easy to address. The more a plan focuses on
individual efforts rather than measures of corporate (group) performance,
the more it needs to rely on more subjective views of individual
performance. This is difficult to measure, especially among senior
executives where the output is often collective and intangible. The reliance
on subjective measures may also conflict with the concerns of equity theory
because the use of such measures risks perceptions of favoritism or
unfairness.
3. Insufficiently High Performance Hurdles
A major problem with the use of performance-based compensation as
a means of motivating executives is the failure of such plans to set
bonus pool of which some amount is available for grant to a particular individual.
Typically, something like 70-80% of that amount would be awarded automatically and the
remaining 20-30% would be awarded depending upon individual performance. In the case
of the CEO, failing to adjust for individual versus company performance is often justified by
the fact that it is difficult to evaluate CEO performance independent of company
performance. However, even for senior executive officers, the variation in award based on
individual performance is generally quite small.
143. See Alan M. Johnson & Neil D. Hobart, Why Is It So Hard to Pay for
Performance?, 4 J. CoMp. BENEFrrs 358, 358 (1989) (suggesting that the adjustments made
for individual performance in annual incentive plans are insufficient).
144. Id. at 360.
145. It may be indirectly dependent on the individual's performance in the sense that an
executive's actions may positively or negatively affect the company's stock price.
1999]
264 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:2
sufficiently high performance hurdles. The biggest offender is the stock
option grant. The number of stock options granted to senior executives,
particularly company CEOs is often staggeringly large.1 46 Option grants
valued in excess of $1 million are common. In fact, a number of CEOs of
large corporations received awards in 1997 worth $10 million or more.147
Many more options are granted than are necessary to serve as a
motivating factor. Granting an executive 100,000 options, for example,
might produce a certain incentive effect. It is, however, not plausible to
think that granting that same executive one million options would result in
a ten-fold increase in the executive's motivation, and therefore,
performance.
1 48
However, the reality is far worse than a conclusion that the large
option grants are pointless. Instead, it is more likely that the size of grants
diminishes their incentive effect,149 a conclusion consistent with the
postulate of goal-setting theory that goals need to be sufficiently
challenging. Options are generally granted with an exercise price equal to
150the fair market value of the company's stock on the date of grant °. This
means that an executive who is granted one million options does not have
to do very much to reap a large return. If the company's stock goes up
merely one dollar between the date of grant and the date of exercise, the
executive reaps $1,000,000 in compensation.'5 l Particularly during times
146. See Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 1 (reporting that more than half of the executives
surveyed received stock option grants in 1997 worth more than $5 million each).
147. See Jennifer Reingold, The Folly of Jumbo Stock Options: Huge Grants Don't
Always Work As Incentives, Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 1997, at 36 (according to an analysis of
1997 proxies, "27% of CEOs at the largest 200 companies were awarded grants worth $10
million or more, up from 17% the previous year"; option grants topping $1 million are
common).
148. Recent evidence supports the conclusion that large stock option grants do not
necessarily foster impressive results. According to a study recently conducted by Graef
Crystal, who analyzed the companies whose CEOs received the most valuable option grants
in 1995, the top granting companies beat the S&P 500 by only four percentage points
between 1995 and 1997. See id. at 36 (quoting Crystal as suggesting that "[i]f you're trying
to retail the notion that huge grants should give you tremendous motivation, you haven't
proved very much"); see also G. Bennett Stewart III., Readers Report: A Pay Plan That
Rewards Long-Term Thinking, Bus. WK., Aug. 24, 1992, at 7 (suggesting that a plan which
gives away "buckets" of stock options cannot be considered a performance-based
compensation plan because it does not provide managers with incentives to think like long-
term owners).
149. See Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 8 (citing critics of the current compensation system
who argue that huge option grants enrich average performers as well as the top performers);
Reingold, supra note 147, at 36 (citing Patrick S. McGurn, director of corporate programs at
Institutional Shareholder Services, to the effect that mega-grants of stock options foster
mediocrity).
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
151. See Bryant, supra note 26, §4, at 1 (noting that the option grants are so huge that
"even a small uptake in the [company's] stock price can translate into millions of dollars in
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when the stock market in general is doing well, it does not take very much
effort to cause a company's stock to rise one dollar. Indeed, a company led
by a recipient of a hefty enough stock option grant could do less well than
the market as a whole, and still generate an enormous return to the
executive, and many have.
152
The failure to set performance hurdles high enough in short-term
incentive plans is also a problem. Some have suggested that bonus
formulas tied to short-term profits are so undemanding that executives are
rarely denied payments. 53
4. Manipulative Behavior
One of the important teachings of motivation literature is that pay
must actually depend on performance. It is important that contingent pay
arrangements cannot be manipulated so that executives are well paid even
in situations where their performance is not up to par. Unfortunately, as
currently administered, manipulation154 is possible with respect to both
short-term and long-term incentive plans.
Short-term incentive plans are subject to manipulation because
executives can make decisions designed to affect the plan benchmarks and
thus to affect the amount of their bonus payment. For example, if a short-
term incentive plan uses earnings as a benchmark, an executive might
decide to defer expenses that should be incurred, or might engage in a
transaction designed to increase short-term earnings. If a plan uses sales or
paper profits"); Kadlec, supra note 5, at 59 (stating that if granted 1 million stock options,
the CEO gets an instant $1 million if stock rises one dollar, and "[tihat's pay for showing
up, not pay for performance"); Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1997,
at 58 (noting that if Disney shares increased a mere two dollars annually, the value of
Michael Eisner's options would be $10 million annually).
152. For example, King World Productions, Inc.'s CEO Michael King received a grant
of 1.5 million options in December, 1995. In the year after the option grant, the S&P gained
61%, while King World's stock rose 41%. Despite the lackluster company performance,
King's options were worth $24.5 million at the end of 1996. See Reingold, supra note 147,
at 36 (also providing as examples the CEO's of Mirage Resorts and Grand Casinos, each of
whom received one million options and each of whose companies underperformed
compared to the S&P 500); see also Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 1 (providing examples of
CEOs with large gains in accumulated stock option wealth whose companies' stocks
underperformed in comparison with their peers).
153. See, e.g., Anna Smith, Bonuses Reach Factory Floor, DOMINION, Feb. 26, 1997, at
20 (citing consultant Kira Schaffler, who determined that senior executives are likely to
receive bonuses regardless of how well they perform); Worthy of His Hire?, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 1, 1992, at 19 (stating that bonus formulas are so undemanding that a bonus is virtually
a part of an executive's base salary).
154. I am speaking here about actions which have the effect of producing pay that is
unrelated to performance, not the type of market manipulation that is subject to legal
sanctions under the federal securities laws.
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other indicators that increase with size, an executive may decide to engage
in growth strategies, such as pursuing non-strategic acquisitions.1 55
Additionally, the plans themselves may be manipulated in their
administration because, as with all accounting measures, the elements used
as measures in short-term incentive plans are subject to manipulation.
15 6
For example, in 1998 Green Tree Financial Corporation was forced to
restate its 1996 profits, resulting in its CEO, Lawrence M. Coss, having to
pay back a significant portion of his 1996 bonus payment.15 7 Green Tree
shareholders had accused the company of using overly aggressive
accounting methods to boost profits, and therefore, Coss's 1996 bonus.'58
To the extent that contingent compensation is viewed as a means of
checking managerial discretion, it is particularly problematic if managers
can legally manipulate the systems which measure company performance.
The same kind of behavior is possible with stock compensation.
Executives may be tempted to take steps to artificially boost stock prices to
maximize their stock compensation 59 However, there are even more
serious ways in which stock option compensation can be, and frequently is,
manipulated.
One of the ways in which stock option compensation can be
manipulated is through the repricing and replacement of "underwater"
stock options, options for which the market price of a stock has fallen
below the option price. 60 Declining share values often cause a company
155. See BOK, supra note 3, at 245 (pointing out that it is difficult to set rewards "large
enough to motivate effectively but not so large as to tempt people to resort to improper or
even illegal behavior to qualify").
156. See id. (noting that evaluation methods must be accurate and objective so that they
cannot be manipulated); Vagts, supra note 7, at 242-43 (noting that earnings-based
compensation plans may drive executives towards illegal actions because they are calculated
on increasing profit and that annualized earnings figures are manipulated).
157. See Martha M. Hamilton, Bonus King to Pay Back Chunk of $102 Million Take,
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at E01 (reporting that Coss could have to repay $30 to $40
million of a $102 million dollar bonus); Adam Zagorin, Too Good to Be True: Larry Coss,
the Prince of Pay, Must Give Back a Big Chunk of His Bonus, TIME, Feb. 23, 1998, at 47
(noting that Coss could be repaying $40 million).
158. See Hamilton, supra note 157, at E01 (suggesting that Green Tree's board of
directors was responsible for providing a lucrative contract that gave Coss the incentive to
back such optimistic accounting methods); Zagorin, supra note 157, at 47 (noting the
company's denial that its accounting methods were designed to increase profits, and
therefore, Coss' pay).
159. See Bryant, supra note 26, § 4, at 1 (noting that options provide incentives for
CEOs to take steps to boost stock price, such as engaging in acquisitions and divestitures);
Dean Foust, The SEC's CEO-Pay Plan: No Panacea: Studies Suggest Linking Pay to
Performance Actually Hurts Performance, Bus. WK., July 6, 1992, at 37 (quoting Meredith
Corp. Chairman Robert Burnett as concluding that linking pay and stock prices is just an
invitation to management to manipulate figures and actions).
160. There are no legal impediments to the practice of option repricing. The replacement
of underwater options involves no violation of state corporate law, provided directors have
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either to cancel existing options and replace them with options at a lower
exercise price, or to reprice existing options, keeping the original vesting
and expiration dates of the option.16 ' For example, after the stock market
crash of 1987, directors of Northrop allowed the company's CEO to swap
1.2 million options to buy company stock at $45.88 per share for 1.2
million options to purchase the stock at $29.88 per share. 162
Replacing underwater stock options is sometimes justified on the
ground that such options have lost their incentive value to executives. 63 At
some justification for the decision to issue replacement options. See generally Cohen v.
Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that replacement of underwater options
by the board of directors of Sears, Roebuck & Co. did not constitute corporate waste); Udoff
v. Zipf, 375 N.E.2d 392, 395 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that whether replacement of underwater
options gave rise to a cause of action depended on an evaluation of "the directors' decision
from the standpoint of the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, in light of the
financial and market situation which confronted the directors at the time of their decision,
with due recognition of the scope of discretion vested in a corporate board"). The
replacement of underwater options is also exempt from section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
so long as the option grant satisfies the requirements of the exception contained in Rule 16b-
3 to the prohibition on short-swing profits. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d)(3) (1974). Nor
does the cancellation and replacement of stock options have any negative federal income tax
consequences to executives. There is likewise currently no accounting effect from the
cancellation and replacement of underwater options because the Financial Accounting
Statements Board takes the position that repricing does not convert an option into a
"variable option", thus requiring expense recognition. See ARTHuR ANDERSEN & Co.,
AccOuNTING FOR COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 53-54 (2d ed.
1991) (citing report of FASB Emerging Issues Task Force); Highlights and Pitfalls: Market
Opportunities: Replacing Underwater Stock Options, CORP. COUNSEL, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at
3. However, the FASB is currently considering a proposal to require recognition of an
expense when options are repriced. See FASB Mulls Deadline for Accounting Costs of
Options Repricing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1998, at A6 [hereinafter FASB Mulls Deadline].
161. See Marcia Berss, Reviewing Your Repricing Options, CORP. BOARD MEMBER,
Winter 1998, at 47 (noting that stock option repricing is spreading like the plague and giving
Reebok International and Apple Computer as examples of companies who have recently
repriced; Apple Computer has repriced four times in a five-year period); Bryant, supra note
26, §4, at 4 (noting that many companies respond to falling stock prices by lowering the
price of options, which has the "perverse" effect of rewarding poor performance); Andres
Martinez, Moving the Goal Posts: Options Repricing Gives Companies a Powerful Tool to
Retain Workers; Critics See it as Rewarding Failure, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R4
(suggesting that the practice of repricing executive stock options is becoming more
prevalent); see also Reingold, supra note 147, at 36 (suggesting the investor reaction has not
discouraged option repricing).
162. See BLAIR, supra note 3, at 90. This created an immediate "gain" of $4.5 million
for the CEO. See CRYSTAL, supra note 26, at 133-37 (giving as examples of "serious
options swapping," Texas Air's swapping of CEO Frank Lorenzo's options and swapping of
executive and employee options by Apple Computer); Elizabeth Holtzman, CEO Pay: How
Much Is Enough?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jul.-Aug. 1992, at 130, 139 (describing repricing of
options by General Dynamics in 1991, which resulted in paying twenty-three General
Dynamics executives $35 million in pay, bonuses and options-three times their 1990
compensation).
163. See, e.g., Yale D. Tauber et al., Trends, Issues and Predictions in Executive
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some level, this argument is appealing. If options are sufficiently
underwater the executive may perceive that it is impossible that her efforts
will bring the company's stock back above the exercise price. In that
situation both goal-setting theory and expectancy theory would argue that
the option has lost its incentive value. If the goal is unattainable, it cannot
motivate.
However, the stock price drops that precede repricing rarely make the
original exercise price unattainable. On facts similar to the Northrop
example above, after the decline in stock price, it is true that the CEO held
options with an exercise price well above the then-trading price of the
shares. However, stock options generally have a long exercise period after
they become vested-typically ten years. Even though Northrop's share
price had to rise above $45.88 from its trading price of $29.88 before it
would become worthwhile to exercise the shares, the CEO, likely had
plenty of time for the stock price to rise before the options would expire.
Even after the dramatic decline in share price, the options were not
worthless and the CEO had an incentive to see the company's stock price
rise to $45.88 and beyond.
Moreover, the general practice is to reprice options to the level to
which the company's price has fallen, magnifying the problem of
insufficiently high performance hurdles. This is particularly troublesome
where the decline in a company's stock is part of a general decline in the
market, meaning that when the market rises again, the company's stock is
likely to rise along with it, without any particular effort on the part of the
executive. If one followed motivation theories, any option repricing should
be to a price somewhere between the original exercise price and the price to
which the company's stock had fallen. Finally, in situations where
companies make annual option grants, the fact that some options will not
motivate because they have become worthless means little since the
executive has plenty more options to act as an incentive.
Repricing options is clearly dangerous to an attempt to use
compensation to motivate executives. As one critic observed, "[o]ptions
declare that if the company wins, you win. Options repricing declares that
if the company loses, you still win." 164 Nothing could be more inconsistent
Compensation Planning Techniques and Strategies, in ExEcuTvE COMPENSATION
WORKSHOP 1989, at 51-52 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Planning Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 284, 1989) ("underwater options have little or no incentive value or hold (i.e., 'golden
handcuff) on executives"); E.S. Browning & Laura Jereski, In New York: Sagging Stocks
Don't Penalize Some Executives, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 12, 1997, at 15 (suggesting that
repricing maintains incentive for executives to stay with company and do things that will
push up stock price).
164. E.S. Browning & Laura Jereski, In The Money: Firms With Sagging Stocks Set New
'Repricings' of Executive Options, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1997, at C1 (quoting Bart Naylor,
head of the Teamsters' corporate affairs, who calls option repricing "the most heinous
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with the teachings of motivation theory.
Option compensation can also be manipulated through granting
"reload" options. 165 Under a reload option, an executive who exercises
options is given an additional option to buy the same number of options as
he exercised, at the market price on the date he exercised. These new
options have the same expiration date as the original options.
An example will help to illustrate why reload options are really a
guaranteed source of additional income without being a motivating
incentive. Assume that an executive received an option to purchase 100
shares at ten dollars a share. The shares are now trading at fifteen dollars
per share. If the executive either does not exercise, or exercises the option
and holds the shares purchased, she faces the same risk faced by
shareholders generally, that the price of the stock will fall below fifteen
dollars. On the other hand, if she exercises the option and sells the shares
she locks in the five dollar per share gain, but, having sold her shares, no
longer has the ability to benefit if the price of the shares rises above fifteen
dollars.
The reload option gives the executive the best of all possible worlds.
The executive in my example can exercise her option and sell the shares
obtained upon exercise, thus locking in the five dollar share gain. She then
retains an option to purchase another 100 shares at an exercise price of
fifteen dollars which was the fair market value at the time of exercise of the
original option. If the stock price falls, she will not exercise the new option
and thus loses nothing. However, if the stock price rises, she now has the
ability to benefit from the increase. 166  Necessarily, this type of
hypocrisy" in executive compensation); see also Martinez, supra note 161, at R4 (noting
that the repricing of stock options is opposed because it "rewards failure and undermines
options' incentive power").
165. See CRYSTAL, supra note 26, at 178 (noting that granting reload options makes
stock options less risky by guaranteeing the CEO that he will receive the highest possible
price for his option shares); Warren F. Grienenberger, The Rise of Institutional Investors, in
INSTrrTToNAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1996, at 317, 355 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 917, 1996) (noting that the fact that reload options
allow a recipient to reap the highest possible price for the option shares with almost no risk
may constitute a conflict of interest between outside shareholders and the option recipient).
166. As with replacement of underwater options, there is no legal impediment to this
practice. So long as the requirements of Rule 16b-3 are met, there should be no 16(b)
problems created by reload options. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(5) (1997). So long as the
reload options are granted at the fair market value on the date of grant, no compensation
expense will have to be recognized for accounting purposes. See ARTHUR AND RSON, supra
note 160, at 28 (citing report of FASB Emerging Issues Task Force). The granting of the
reload option has no tax consequences, although the exercise of the options would create
income recognition in the case of nonqualified options. So the difference between
exercising an option with an exercise price of $10 per share at a time when the shares are
trading for $20, and exercising the original option at $15 per share, being granted a reload
option at $15 that is then exercised at $20, is not one of tax amounts but rather of timing. In
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compensation plan weakens the link between pay and performance and
thus limits the ability of option compensation to motivate executives.
5. Ability to Sell Shares
The ability of an executive to sell shares once options have been
exercised further limits the effectiveness of stock compensation as a
motivator of performance. If the executive can sell the shares, then even if
the grant of an option created a link between pay and performance, the
executive's fortunes, unlike those of shareholders, do not remain tied to
company performance. In fact, many employees exercise options and
immediately sell shares as soon as the options are vested.' 67
This immediate selling of shares is frequently accomplished through
"cashless exercise," whereby executives can exercise their options without
having to use additional personal funds to purchase the shares at the
exercise price of the option shares subject to the option, because the
exercise price is paid from the proceeds of the sale of shares acquired upon
exercise. 161 This practice has been facilitated by the SEC's rules under
the former case, the entire tax is delayed until the exercise at $20 per share; in the latter, a
portion of the tax is paid at the earlier exercise.
167. See Kerry Capell, Options for Everyone, Bus. WK., July 22, 1996, at 80, 82 (citing
survey results indicating that option recipients generally sell immediately upon exercise);
see also Brownstein & Panner, supra note 3, at 35 (stating that less than 50% of the shares
acquired upon exercise of stock options are held for a significant period of time); Joann S.
Lublin, Buy or Bye, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1993, at R9 (reporting that most executives sell
stock obtained upon exercise of options within a few years after exercise). But see
CRYSTAL, supra note 26, at 121 (describing how the sale of company shares is considered
"poor taste" or "disloyal" and many investors pay significant attention to sales by corporate
insiders).
In fact, "CEO stock ownership for large public companies... was ten times greater in
the 1930s than in the 1980s." Jensen & Murphy, supra note 9, at 139, 141 (noting that 90%
of CEOs own less than one percent of their company's stock).
168. One way this is accomplished is for a company to simply give the executive a check
representing the difference between the exercise price and the market value of the shares on
the exercise date, that is, the amount the executive would have received by exercising her
options and immediately reselling the shares. See CRYSTAL, supra note 26, at 65. However,
the exercise is more commonly done through a broker who "loans" the executive the money
to exercise the shares and sells the shares of stock acquired upon exercise on behalf of the
executive. The proceeds are used to pay the broker for fronting the exercise price as well as
for paying any income tax obligations associated with the exercise. The executive receives
the rest. See Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 8 (describing the transaction between a broker and
the executive).
There is an advantage to exercising through a broker. If the employer cashes-out the
executive, there is a risk of adverse accounting consequences. The option would be treated
for accounting purposes like a stock appreciation right, which requires an accounting
charge. A company must recognize as an expense the cost of a stock appreciation right over
its life in a manner that reflects the appreciation in the value of the stock to which the stock
appreciation right relates and the rate at which it becomes exercisable. See ACCOUNTING
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section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which no longer require
that an executive hold the stock received upon exercise of an option for six-
months prior to selling the shares, 169 and Regulation T, which allows a
broker-dealer to assist in the sale of shares acquired upon exercise of an
option. 170 Permitting executives to exercise options without laying out their
own money makes it easier for executives to divest themselves of their
shares as soon as the options become exercisable.
If the goal of contingent compensation is really to motivate executives
by linking their fortunes to the success of the company, a better way to
achieve that goal could be to focus on long-term equity ownership by
executives.17 1  In fact, some companies are requiring their executives to
FOR STOCK APPRECIATION RIGHTS AND OTHER VARIABLE STOCK OPTION OR AWARD PLANS,
Interpretation of Financial Accounting Standards No. 28 (Financial Accounting Standards
Bd. 1978). However, cashless exercise through a broker is treated like an open market
transaction not involving the issuer and thereby not resulting in any accounting expense.
See ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., supra note 160, at 28-29 (stating that cashless exercise is in
substance a stock appreciation right and therefore is accounted for as a variable plan. If
exercised through a broker, there is no variable plan accounting because no cash is paid by
the company).
169. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) of 1934 imposes strict
liability on officers, directors and 10% shareholders who profit from short-swing
transactions, that is, purchases and sales of securities of their company within a six-month
period. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1994). However, rule 16b-3 contains an exemption for
securities issued pursuant to employee benefit plans and compensation arrangements. With
respect to stock options, the rules provide an exemption from the liability provisions of
section 16(b) for the grant of stock options and also provide an exemption for the purchase
of employer stock pursuant to the exercise of an option. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(5)
(1997). As long as the conditions for exemption are met, an executive is free to exercise an
option and resell the resulting stock immediately without facing §16(b) liability.
170. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(e)(4) (1998). However, there may be negative consequences
of a cashless exercise. The immediate sale upon exercise of an incentive stock option would
be a disqualifying disposition, resulting in loss of the favorable tax treatment of such
options. See I.R.C. §§ 422(a), 421(b) (1994).
171. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 9, at 141 (describing how control of a meaningful
percentage of a corporation's shares, will cause executives to "experience a direct and
powerful 'feedback effect' from changes in market value"); Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay
the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 60, 65, 68 (noting that a performance-based plan
that is well designed will incorporate provisions requiring the CEO to retain a large number
of shares because that involves an element of risk and incentive for the CEO); Leslie P.
Norton, Velvet Handcuffs, BARRON'S, July 24, 1995, at 21, 23 (citing Nell Minow that the
only way for managers to think like shareholders is to promote executive stock ownership).
However, not everyone agrees that there is a consistently positive relationship
between corporate performance and executive stock ownership. See, e.g., John J.
McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595, 603-09 (1990) (describing how corporate performance
increases as management's percentage of stock ownership increases from zero to 25% but
declines beyond 25%); see also Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 294-95 (1988) (noting that
corporate performance improves when director stock ownership increases from zero to 5%,
but then declines beyond 5%).
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maintain specified levels of equity in their company.' 72 This can be done in
a number of ways. An employer can include executives in an employee
stock ownership plan (an "ESOP") established for the benefit of all of its
employees. 173 Another possibility is for the employer to adopt an employee
stock purchase plan, pursuant to which executives would regularly
purchase employer securities at a discount.' 74
172. See Lederer & Weinberg, supra note 138, at 32 (citing survey results of companies
whose proxies mention ownership guidelines and providing as examples of companies with
such guidelines, specifically General Mills and Quaker Oats); Lublin, supra note 167, at R9
(discussing the fact that some businesses require CEOs and other senior executives to invest
between one and ten times their annual salaries in stock, providing a period of time for the
executives to reach the ownership targets); Norton, supra note 171, at 21 (stating that about
20% of American companies with annual revenues greater than $1 billion have guidelines
requiring certain levels of stock ownership by senior executives, including American
Express, Ford Motor Co., Intel, J.C. Penny, BankAmerica, Xerox, Bell Atlantic and J.P.
Morgan). See generally Reingold, supra note 151, at 58 (noting that companies are using
CEO stock ownership to align executive and shareholder interests)..
173. An ESOP is a tax-qualified pension plan which is designed to invest primarily in
employer securities. The employer either contributes shares of stock to the ESOP or
contributes cash, which is used by the ESOP trustee to purchase shares. At the time shares
are contributed or purchased, they are placed in a suspense account and are referred to as
"unallocated shares." Shares are allocated to individual plan participants on the basis of a
formula, such as allocation proportional to compensation. Retirement benefits from an
ESOP are generally paid in stock, although in the case of a company whose stock is not
publicly traded, the employee has the option of selling shares distributed by the ESOP back
to the employer. See generally JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP:
REVOLUTION OR RiPoFF? 60 (1988) (explaining the basic configurations of an ESOP Plan);
Henry C. Blackiston III et al., ESOPs: What They Are and How They Work, 45 Bus. LAW.
85 (1989) (discussing the mechanics and application of ESOPs); D. Bret Carlson, ESOP and
Universal Capitalism, 31 TAX L. REv. 289, 299-314 (1976) (examining the legislative
history of ESOPs). Both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") contain special rules regulating ESOPs. See 29 U.S.C.
§1107; I.R.C. §423. According to the National Center for Employee Ownership, about
9,500 U.S. corporations have ESOPs, covering more than ten million employees. See
Edward J. Giblin et al., When Employees Own the Company .... ACROSS BOARD, Oct. 1,
1995, at 42.
174. Employers generally have a large amount of flexibility in designing employee stock
purchase plans even though such plans create securities law issues since they involve the
purchase and sale of a security. Section 423 of the Code provides favorable federal income
tax treatment for employees who participate in such plans, so long as certain conditions are
met. See I.R.C. §423. The tax treatment is similar to the favorable tax treatment for
incentive stock options under §422 of the Code, that is, that the exercise of the option has no
tax consequences; instead, taxation is deferred until the sale of the shares acquired upon
exercise. See MICHAEL J. CANAN & WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND
BENEFrr WELFARE PLANS § 7.3 (1991 ed.); Giblin, supra note 173, at 42. At that point, the
gain realized on the option is taxed as capital gains, rather than as ordinary income. See
CANAN & MITCHELL, supra §7.1.
One big difference between an ESOP and an employee stock purchase plan is that an
ESOP, because it is a qualified plan, must benefit a large class of employees in order to
comply with non-discrimination rules in the Code. An employer could limit participation in
an employee stock purchase plan to executives only if it were willing to forego the favorable
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However, even these suggestions may not work. The presence of an
active derivatives market, which allows executives to retain shares in the
company while diversifying their investment risk, may operate to defeat the
motivational effect of stock compensation. 175 An example will illustrate
how the goal of executive stock ownership can be disturbed through the use
of derivatives. Assume an executive holds 500,000 shares of her
company's stock, a large enough number that the performance of that stock
has a significant effect on the overall financial well-being of the executive.
The stock is currently worth $10 million. If the executive is not free to sell
the shares, she can enter into a commonly-used derivative product, an
equity swap. 17 6 Instead of selling the shares of the company, the executive
"swaps" the performance of the shares over a specified period with the
performance of a diversified portfolio of stocks. For example, the
executive finds a counter-party willing to enter into a contract whereby the
executive pays the gain from the 500,000 shares of stock over a five-year
period and the counter-party agrees to pay the executive the income from
an investment of $10 million in a diversified portfolio of stocks. 7 7 This
effectively transforms the executive's risk from the performance of the
company's shares to the performance of a diversified portfolio.
There may be other means whereby the executive can accomplish the
same thing. The essential point is that while the executive continues to
hold the shares, she is not affected by the results of the company's
performance in the same way an ordinary shareholder of the company is
affected.
171
tax treatment provided for by §423.
175. Derivatives are contracts which derive their value from the value of the underlying
asset, such as interest rates, equities, currencies, or commodities, to which the contract is
related. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism,
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 861, 947 n.185 (1997); see also
Bank, supra note 8, at 314.
176. Swaps, or notional principal contracts, allow hedging against risks relating to
movement in interest or foreign exchange rates or against risks of other market factors.
Parties to a swap contract "swap" their positions with respect to a risk associated with
specific assets, in this case equity. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the
Modem Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1273, 1274 n.4 (1991) (noting that swaps are instruments which hedge against risks
such as interest rates, commodity prices, and currencies; in 1990 more than $656.1 billion of
swaps were entered into). For an explanation of the operation of a typical interest rate swap,
see EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AL., 2 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES MARKET §13.03(2) (3d ed. 1995).
177. What really happens is that the positions are netted out. If the gain from 500,000
shares of stock over a five-year period is $100,000 and the income from an investment of
$10 million in a diversified portfolio is $120,000, the counter-party would pay the executive
$20,000.
178. See generally Bank, supra note 8 (exploring the use of the derivatives market by
executives).
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IV. UTILIZING THE LEARNING FROM MOTIVATION THEORIES: BETTER
WAYS TO ACHIEVE THE MOTIVATION AIM OF CONTINGENT
COMPENSATION
A. Improving the Effectiveness of Contingent Compensation Plans
The discussion in Section IIB of this article regarding some of the
major deficiencies in how contingent compensation is currently structured
and administered suggests that we are not currently maximizing the
motivating potential of contingent compensation. That discussion, together
with the discussion in Section i11A of prevalent motivation theories,
suggests that there are ways the system can be improved.
The logical place to start improvement is with suggestions for reform
aimed at option compensation. Options are the most prevalent form of
long-term contingent compensation1 79 and the way option plans are
currently structured minimizes the ability to achieve the goal of motivating
executives. There are several strategies that would improve the ability of
options to successfully motivate executives.
The first suggestion is that options be granted with an exercise price
greater than the fair market value of the stock on the date of grant of the
option. As is clear from the prior discussion, granting options with an
exercise price equal to the fair market value on the date of option grant is
inconsistent with prevalent motivation theories. The insufficiently high
performance hurdle violates both goal-setting and expectancy theory.
Moreover, equity theory tells us that for options to function as a means of
incentive, compensation received from them must be truly related to
performance, and not to non-performance related functions such as simple
movements in the market.
One means of raising the bar would be to grant options with a fixed
premium over the fair market value at the date of grant, which has been
To the extent an executive does not diversify his company stock exposure through the
use of derivatives or other means, shareholders may also suffer because "management may
have an incentive to pursue strategies such as diversification that will reduce these risks.
But shareholders, through the diversification of their portfolios, have already reduced these
risks to the extent they deem appropriate. Thus, further risk reduction by managers may be
contrary to the best interests of shareholders." Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on
Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV.
201, 207-08 (1996); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance: An Academic Perspective, in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 1992, at 647, 665-66 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
792, 1992) (stating that because shareholders can diversify their portfolios, they are risk
neutral regarding external influences on company stock price; because executives are less
diversified, they bear the risk of such influences and thus become risk averse).
179. See sources cited supra note 26.
MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES
recommended by shareholder groups. i 0 In fact, some companies have
begun to engage in the practice. Premium pricing raises the performance
bar over fair market value options, but is not a perfect means since it
requires an assumption about what the market will do. A better alternative
would be not to grant options with a fixed premium price, but rather, to
182grant performance or indexed options. 2 This would ensure that the
amount of compensation received by the executive is truly a function of
outstanding performance by the executive in leading the company, and not
to positive performance by a particular industry or the market in general.
Granting such options means that if the company does no more than keep
pace with its competitors or the market, the options are worthless.'83 For
example, the CEO of Level 3 received options that will be valueless if both
the S&P index and Level 3's stock rise ten percent. If Level 3's stock
outperforms the S&P index by five percent, the CEO's 1998 options will be
worth $1.55 million. However, if Level 3's stock outperforms the S&P
index by fifteen percent, the options will be worth $11 million.' 4
Similarly, at a time when Transamerica Corporation shares were trading at
$93.19 a share, its CEO was granted 645,000 options that will pay off only
if the company's stock rises to more than $150 a share within five years
and only if the company's total shareholder return from the date of grant is
at least at the median of its industry peer group.11
180. See Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 8 (reporting that Council of Institutional Investors
has proposed that "incentive pay should be structured so that executives cash in only if they
outperform the overall market").
181. See id. § 3, at 9 (naming Transamerica, Monsanto and BankAmerica as examples of
companies who have granted options with exercise prices at greater than fair market value
on the date of grant); see also Shawn Tully, CEO Pay, FORTUNE, June 8, 1998, at 272, 276
(noting that Colgate-Palmolive and Ecolab CEOs receive "premium priced" options. The
Colgate-Palmolive CEO received a mega-grant of 2.6 million premium priced options which
replaces annual option awards for seven years).
182. An indexed option ties the exercise price of the option to an external measure, such
as the S&P index. The exercise price changes proportionately to the change in the index.
See Joseph E. Bachelder I1, Premium-Priced, Hurdle and Indexed Options, N.Y.L.J., June
29, 1993, at 3; Clawson & Klein, supra note 26, at 32-33 (arguing that instead of granting
options with fixed exercise prices, options should be granted with an adjustable exercise
price that is indexed to the appreciation of the granting company's stock price relative to the
appreciation of the company's industry peers). Professors Clawson and Klein argue that it
is not enough to simply fix the exercise price of an option at a value greater than fair market
value, because the exercise price is fixed without regard for external influences on stock
price. Indexing ensures that only increases in stock value attributable to executive
performance rather than simply to favorable market or industry conditions result in
increased pay. See id. at 46-47.
183. Indexing options also avoids the problems faced by companies that use premium
priced plans in times of bad stock markets forcing good executives to leave because they are
not getting paid. See Tully, supra note 181, at 278.
184. See id.
185. See Bryant, supra note 3, § 3, at 9.
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One reason more companies have not engaged in imaginative option
pricing strategies is concern that doing so will result in adverse accounting
consequences. To fully appreciate this point, it is necessary to understand
that as a general matter options are costless from an accounting point of
view. 1 6  The accounting treatment for stock options is specified in
Accounting Principles Board Opinion 25, which essentially provides that
so long as options are granted with an exercise price that is at least equal to
the fair market value of the shares subject to the grant, no compensation
expense needs to be recognized with respect to the options.187 Stock
options are the only type of compensation that generate an expense that is
deductible for tax purposes... but that does not have to be expensed for
financial accounting purposes."'Although it appeared for a time that the Financial Accounting
186. Because options generally involve no compensation expense, they are sometimes
referred to as "stealth compensation." See Executive Compensation: Draft Bill Seeks
Options Expensing in Return for Favorable Tax Treatment, Pensions & Benefits Daily
(BNA) No. 24 (Mar. 13, 1997); see also Hearings on S. 1198, supra note 8, at 9-10.
Options are not completely costless. As with all stock compensation, they carry a cost
to shareholders in terms of dilution. But there is no cost to the company in granting options.
187. See APB OPINION No. 25, supra note 27, 10. The expense does not need to be
recognized because 10 specifies that the measurement date for determining compensation
costs in stock option plans is the first date on which both the number of shares that an
individual is entitled to receive and the option price are known. Thus, the compensation
expense is zero for an option granted with an option price equal to the fair market value of
the shares.
Under certain circumstances, options will give rise to an accounting charge. In the
case of performance options, where the number of shares or the exercise price is contingent
upon future performance, the measurement date does not occur at the grant date. Similarly,
if options are granted subject to later shareholder approval, there is no measurement date
until approval is obtained. See id. However, changes in the terms of outstanding options
due to certain equity restructurings pursuant to anti-dilution provisions do not give rise to a
new measurement date and thus do not require recognition of an accounting expense.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE, Minutes of
Nov. 8, 1990 Meeting, Issue 90-9.
188. An employer receives a deduction equal to the amount of ordinary income required
to be recognized by an employee in connection with the exercise of an option. See 26
U.S.C. § 83(h) (1994).
189. To give a sense of the constraint that might be imposed if companies had to expense
options, accounting for the cost of stock options would have reduced the 1996 reported
earnings of MCI Communications by 5% and would have completely wiped out all of
Netscape's current earnings. See Roger Lowenstein, Coming Clean on Company Stock
Options, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at Cl.
Options also have favorable accounting in another respect. The FASB recently
announced a change to the basic earnings-per-share calculation. When a company
calculates its earnings per share, it need not adjust the number of shares for options that are
outstanding and in the money. So, not only is the grant of options "costless" from an
accounting point of view, but the large number of outstanding options in the hands of
executives has no impact on earnings per share. See Elizabeth MacDonald, FASB Rules to
Lift Firms' Per-Share Net, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1997, at A3.
1999] MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES
Standards Board ("FASB") would amend Opinion 25 to require that
companies recognize an expense in connection with options granted, 90 it
abandoned that notion in December, 19942'f Instead, it adopted a much
more limited rule in 1995, giving companies the choice of either expensing
options based on fair market value or providing footnote disclosure of the
cost of options granted. 192 That means that a company granting an option at
190. In April, 1993, the FASB voted to issue new rules that would require immediate
increased disclosure of stock option compensation and beginning on January 1, 1997, would
require the recognition of an expense for stock options. See Accounting, FASB Approves
Stock Compensation Rules, but Postpones Effective Date on Expense, Pensions & Benefits
Daily (BNA) (Apr. 8, 1993) [hereinafter FASB Approves Stock Compensation Rules]. At
the time of the vote, the FASB indicated that it expected to issue an exposure draft of the
proposed rules in June. It also designated a six-month comment period, to be followed by a
public hearing, expected to be held in early 1994. See id.; see also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTICNG
STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION, Proposed Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation (Financial Accounting
Series No. 127-L, 1993).
191. The FASB appeared to retreat from its position in response to concerns about
whether options could be reliably valued as well as concerns with potential adverse effects
on high technology firms of expensing options. A number of arguments were voiced by
corporate leaders during the FASB hearings. Some argued that options have no value, or at
least none that can be fairly measured. Additionally, representatives of high technology
firms expressed the concern that expense recognition prevents them from being able to offer
stock-based compensation. See FASB Abandons Bid to Require Expensing of Employee
Stock Options, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1725 (Dec. 23, 1994) [hereinafter
FASB Abandons Bid].
Opposition to the FASB proposal was not limited to corporate leaders. At the time it
was initially announced, then Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentson expressed "reservations"
about the proposal, suggesting that increased disclosure was more appropriate than requiring
companies to take a "highly debatable" earnings charge when granting options. See FASB
Approves Stock Compensation Rules, supra note 190. Nor was Bentson alone in terms of
government opposition. One FASB member implied that the introduction of several bills in
Congress, including one that would have given the SEC veto power over the FASB's
rulemaking was part of the reason for the FASB's backing off from its proposal. See FASB
Abandons Bid, supra. The Senate was not monolithic on this issue. In June 1993, Senator
Lieberman introduced the Equity Expansion Act, a bill that opposed the FASB proposal,
while senator Levin introduced two bills which would have mandated inclusion of stock
options as expenses. See Steve Burkholder, Executive Compensation: Draft Bill Seeks
Options' Expensing in Return for Favorable Tax Treatment, Pensions & Benefits Daily
(BNA) at d5 (Mar. 13, 1997).
192. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995). Statement 123
encourages companies to accrue a compensation expense over the period of an employee's
service for the increase in the value of options granted based on the fair market value of the
stock. Such accrual is not required if a company makes specified supplemental disclosure
about the options.
This may not be the end of the story. Senators Levin and McCain have introduced a
bill, S. 576, entitled 'Ending Double Standards for Stock Options Act," which would
prevent companies from treating option pay as an expense for tax purposes unless they also
took an expense for accounting purposes. See Sindhu G. Hirani, Associations Unite Against
Bill Tying Favorable Tax Treatment to Expensing, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 105 at d9
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a fixed option price has no accounting charge, but if a company chooses to
grant a performance option, for example, it would incur a charge. 93
This means that in order to eliminate the disincentive to companies to
price options in a manner that would allow them to operate as an incentive,
it is necessary to make a change to the accounting rules so that companies
are forced to recognize an accounting expense upon the granting of options,
a suggestion that has been made by a number of commentators. 94 In
addition to allowing for better option pricing, this can improve the
motivational effect of options in another way. Unless there is a
compensation charge in connection with the granting of options, boards
feel free to give out as many as they choose. If companies had to recognize
a charge, there would be an effective check on the number of options
granted each year; boards would be constrained from granting too many
options for fear of adversely affecting corporate earnings. 95 Since the
effect of mega-option grants is to provide a significant amount of
(June 2, 1997); see also Joan Pryde, Levin, McCain Seeking Support For Senate Bill On
Compensation, Pensions & Benefits Daily (BNA) (Apr. 14, 1997). Consistent with the
opposition to the earlier FASB proposal to require expensing of options, a number of
associations and stock exchanges have expressed the view that the legislation "is misguided
and would have a harmful effect on emerging companies." Hirani, supra. The bill only
affects non-qualified options, since a company gets no tax deduction in connection with an
incentive stock option absent a disqualifying disposition. See supra note 188.
The SEC has decided not to interfere in the accounting issue. The SEC position on
disclosure and accounting issues was expressed in a speech of then Chairman Roberts on
May 20, 1992. Essentially, he said that the SEC is concerned only about the disclosure of
compensation and not about the amount of compensation, that the valuation of options
creates difficult issues, and that the SEC should defer to the FASB on accounting for stock
options. See Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Remarks at the WESFACCA Afternoon with the SEC (May 20, 1992).
193. Under current accounting rules, if a company granted performance options, where
the number of shares or the exercise price is contingent upon future performance, the
measurement date does not occur at grant, with the result that an accounting charge would
occur at the time the number of options and the price became fixed. See APB OPINION No.
25, supra note 27, 110(b) (noting that a measurement date may be later than the date of
grant and may depend on events occurring after grant award date).
194. See Colvin, supra note 171, at 60 (referring to Graef Crystal's examination of CEO
option gains compared to performance of company stock and suggesting the failure to
charge options in financial statements is part of the problem); Thomas A. Stewart, The
Trouble with Stock Options, FORTUNE, Jan. 1, 1990, at 93, 95 (noting that current accounting
treatment of options obscures their costs).
195. According to calculations of the London advisory firm, Smithers & Co., if the 100
largest U.S. companies had recognized a charge to their income statements for their stock
compensation, profits in 1995 would have been 30% lower than reported and profits for
1996 would have been 36% lower. See David Tice, Employee Stock Option Costs Don't
Show on Bottom Line: Lax Accounting Standards Help Companies Hide Big Expenses, ON
WALL STREEr, Jan. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7285009 (noting that in 1998, stock
option compensation amounted to 13.2% of the outstanding shares for all U.S. public
companies). That is a result many boards seek to avoid.
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compensation even if a company's stock rises only slightly, fewer options
require more effort to produce the same level of compensation.
Second, either in addition to or in lieu of increasing the exercise price
of options, companies should consider restructuring option plans such that
post-grant adjustment is possible. The theory behind options acting as a
motivator is that executives wil have an incentive to act in ways that will
benefit shareholders. However, as already discussed, when an option is
granted with a fair market value exercise price, the executive has to do very
little to benefit from the option. One way to address the limited incentive
of fair market options is to structure option plans so that the option grant
can be reduced or even voided if performance does not warrant reward,
thus correcting a real potential for loss if the executive does not perform.
In addition, an executive whose performance is superior could potentially
be rewarded by accelerating the vesting of her options. 116 Under current
accounting rules, these types of arrangements are not appealing, since they
would likely result in a company having to expense options. 19 7 However, if
the accounting rules were changed so that a charge must be recognized
upon option grant, these possibilities lose their comparative disadvantage.
As an aside, although my focus in this discussion is on option reforms,
companies could do the same thing with bonus stock-forfeit the award in
the case of poor performance and accelerate vesting in the case of superior
performance.
The final suggestion regarding options is that the practice of replacing
underwater options be restricted and the practice of granting reload options
be disallowed.
Reload options are easy; it is hard to find any justification for granting
reload options and they are inconsistent with any attempt to motivate
executives. Repricing options is a bit more difficult, since it is true that if
an option is so underwater that there is no hope during the life of the option
that the stock price will ever exceed the exercise price, the option has no
incentive value. In that instance, option repricing serves the same function
as a new option grant. Thus, it is consistent with motivation theory to
allow repricing only in those circumstances. Yet even then, the option
price should be something in excess of the price to which the company's
stock has fallen.
The question then is what is the best means to achieve a restriction on
option repricing and a ban on reload options. To agree that the unrestricted
use of these practices defeats attempts to use options to motivate executives
196. See Johnson & Hobart, supra note 143, at 361.
197. If the number of shares or the exercise price is contingent upon future performance,
the measurement date does not occur at grant and an accounting charge would occur at the
time the number of options and the price became fixed. See APB OPINION No. 25, supra
note 27.
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is not necessarily to recommend that the law enact restrictions. Instead, we
could allow the shareholder proxy process to deal with them. The
argument against an outright ban or restriction is that both repricing and
reload options can be dealt with by shareholder proposals and, in fact,
shareholders have had some success in preventing manipulation of option
compensation through their use of the proxy process.19 s Under that
argument, if a corporation's shareholders are concerned about manipulation
of compensation through these mechanisms, they can voice their
displeasure by passing a proposal prohibiting the board from engaging in
the practice. The SEC has made it easier for shareholders to do that by
improving the disclosure of executive compensation, 99 requiring that
shareholder proposals regarding executive compensation be included in
management's proxy statement at company expense,2°° and making it easier
198. One example is the success of the Wisconsin State Pension fund in its objection to
option repricing by Mentor Graphics. In November 1996, in response to its stock falling to
its lowest level since 1992, Mentor Graphics repriced options to the market price of $7 3/4.
The "repricing 'didn't sit very well with the State of Wisconsin,"' and when the Wisconsin
State Pension Fund (which owns 10% of Mentor Graphics' stock) objected, the Company
promised never again to reprice without shareholder approval. See Browning & Jereski,
supra note 163, at Cl. The Wisconsin State Pension Fund has received the same promise
from other companies. See id.
199. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
200. In 1992, the SEC decided that the issue of executive compensation had become
such a significant policy issue that companies could no longer exclude shareholder
proposals regarding such compensation as ordinary business matters. See Statement of
Richard C. Breedon on Executive Compensation Issues, SEC News Release 92-12, (Feb. 13,
1992), available in 1992 WL 37025. Since then, the SEC has routinely ruled that
shareholder proposals addressing executive and director compensation must be included in a
company's proxy. See, e.g., General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter,(Jan. 28, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 37671 (proposing that no executive be compensated more than $1
million per year, unless paid in accordance with a performance based plan approved by a
majority shareholder vote and included in a company's proxy); General Motors Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, (Mar. 3, 1997), available in 1997 WL 91442 (proposing that all options,
rights and SARs must be disclosed); Sigma-Aldrich Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 4,
1994), available in 1994 WL 66849 (proposing that base salary of the CEO does not exceed
$500,000 and that the CEO does not receive more than 20% of incentive bonus units
pursuant to the Incentive Stock Bonus Plan must be disclosed); Wendy's International, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 7, 1997), available in 1997 WL 109573 (proposing that the
board study and report on the pay, benefits, perks, stock options, and special compensation
arrangements for top officers; that such compensation be linked to shareholder returns; that
it be compared to the lowest and average wages for company employees in the U.S. and
Mexico; and that a cap be placed on executive compensation packages, all of which must be
included in a company's proxy).
The SEC views option repricing as raising significant policy issues and therefore not
excludible as an ordinary business matter. See General DataComm Industries, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, (Dec. 9, 1998), available in 1998 WL 883796. However, the shareholder
process may only work to prevent option repricing without shareholder approval if the stock
plan in question covers only executives. See Shiva Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 10,
1998), available in 1998 WL 111158 (allowing omission of shareholder proposal seeking a
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for shareholders to communicate with each other.2°' On the other hand, if
these practices do nothing but allow boards to manipulate executive
compensation, it is hard to justify the expense and inefficiency of using a
company-by-company shareholder proposal process. There are two other
choices, namely, use legislative means to ban reload options and restrict
repricing or amend FASB principles to discourage the practices by forcing
recognition of an accounting expense. Given competitive factors that may
discourage states from acting-the race to the bottom may prevail-FASB
action may be superior, and in fact, the FASB is currently considering a
proposal to force companies who reprice options to record as an expense
the difference between the new option exercise price and any subsequent
increase in the share price.2°2
Although this article emphasizes reforms aimed at options, changes in
the structure and implementation of short-term incentive plans would be
desirable as well. Such plans should place more emphasis on individual
performance than they currently do. This is consistent with goal setting
and expectancy theory. However, it creates a risk regarding equity theory
to the extent that executives perceive subjectivity in how the individual
portion of the award is determined. Thus, while placing emphasis on
individual performance, to the extent the criteria for individual adjustments
are objective, problems of perceptions in inequity can be minimized.
Second, short-term incentive plans should set realistic, but challenging
goals. Only then can such plans actually have any motivational impact.
Third, some creative thinking should be done to come up with benchmarks
that are less susceptible to manipulation.
B. A Suggestion for Further Research: How Much Should We Be Paying
to Achieve the Desired Goal?
The central point of this article's discussion has been the form of
compensation, rather than the amount executives are paid. However, it
would be a mistake to completely ignore the issue of amount because it
affects attempts to use pay to ultimately improve the financial well-being of
a company.
by-law amendment on the repricing of options on the grounds that the proposal is related to
the company's ordinary business because the company plan gave stock options to
employees, officers, directors, consultants and advisers and not just executives). See
Resolution of Stock Option Repricing Omissible as Relating to Ordinary Business, Corp.
Couns. Wkdy. (BNA) at 2 (Apr. 1, 1998).
201. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276
(1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249) (amending proxy rules to allow for
communication among most shareholders of public companies with respect to issues of
mutual interest and concern without the mechanism of the proxy system being invoked).
202. See FASB Mulls, supra note 160, at A6.
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It is clear from the previous discussion that the theories do not help
answer the question of how much to pay executives. Except for the equity
theory, which addresses the amount of pay in relative terms, the application
of motivation theories to the attempt to use compensation as a motivator
speak to the form in which compensation is paid. Even if we accept that
pay may be motivating, very little work has been done on how much pay is
203necessary to achieve the desired motivation. It may be that paying a
CEO a base salary of $500,000 and contingent compensation with a
potential value of $1 million, if the company does well, will provide an
incentive for the CEO to perform at a very high level. That, however, does
not mean that she would perform any better if the potential value of the
contingent portion of her compensation were $2 million or $3 million, or
that she would perform any less well if the potential value were only
$900,000.204 It is likely that executives are being paid more than is
necessary to motivate them.20s
203. See Herbert G. Heneman III & Rebecca A. Ellis, Behavioral and Industrial
Relations Perspectives on Compensation: Contributed Papers: Correlates of Just
Noticeable Differences in Pay Increases, 33 LAB. L.J. 533, 533-34 (1982) (discussing the
concept of "just noticeable difference," or the minimum or threshold pay increase that
would be perceived to make a difference to an employee and suggesting that very little work
has been done on how much of a pay increase is necessary); Mitra et al., supra note 46, at
71 (commenting that it is not known if a raise of .5% or 20% is large enough to motivate
employees).
204. See Kohn, supra note 1, at 36 (while it may be true that if an employee's pay were
cut in half he might be demoralized and work less, it does not necessarily follow that if the
employee's pay were doubled he would work twice as hard). The only psychological theory
that speaks at all to amount is equity theory, which would suggest that the executive might
work less with a potential contingent award of $900,000 if other comparable executives all
had potential contingent awards of $2 million.
205. To the extent executives are being paid more than is necessary to motivate them,
corporations are making inefficient economic decisions. According to the marginal
productivity theory, employers should pay executives at the value of their marginal
products. An executive's marginal product is "the excess of a firm's total profit under that
person's direction over what it would be under the direction of the best alternative
executive, plus the amount that would have to be paid to secure the latter's services. This
total amount represents the upper limit the firm would be willing to pay the executive."
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia et al., Managerial Control, Performance, and Executive
Compensation, 30 AcAD. MGMT. J. 51, 52 (1987); see also HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 36
(commenting that under the marginal productivity theory, employers pay larger salaries to
those employees whose performance results in larger profits for the company management
and that these increases of salary will be given only to the extent it equals the employee's
performance contribution to the company). Paying executives on the basis of their marginal
productivity accrues certain benefits. Doing so acts not only as an incentive to executives to
expend greater effort, but tends to attract and retain workers who are able and willing to
work hard. See id. at 36. Marginal productivity theory implies that executive performance
must be carefully measured and that pay increases should be set consistent with market
demands. See id.; see also Randy R. Grant, Measuring Corporate Power: Assessing the
Options, 31 J. ECON. IssuEs 457 (1997) (commenting that the marginal productivity theory
bases itself on the assumptions of a neoclassical model; account has to be taken, however, of
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However, that is not the only reason compensation amounts are
important. There is a danger that if compensation is successful in
motivating executives, it may go too far. The unstated assumption behind
using compensation to increase motivation is that increasing motivation
increases performance. It assumes that there is a linear relationship (or
something approaching a linear relationship) between motivation and
performance.
It is, however, worth noting that the assumption that the level of
performance is a constantly increasing function of the level of motivation is
not unassailable. Vroom has suggested that although it is difficult to
determine accurately the relationship between motivation and performance,
there are two alternatives to the assumption of a linear relationship.2°6 The
first is a "negatively accelerated curve approaching an upper limit," which
implies a law of diminishing returns.27 The notion is that "succeeding
increments in motivation of identical amounts result in smaller and smaller
increments in performance until a point is reached at which there is no
further increase in performance. 20
The second alternative, which has been supported by a number of
investigators, is an "inverted U-function," which implies a reduction in
performance under high levels of motivation. The notion here is that
"performance is low at low levels of motivation, reaches its maximum
point under moderate levels of motivation and then drops off again under
high levels of motivation."2°9 Vroom suggests two possible reasons for this
the fact that there are gaps between real wages and labor productivity resulting from
"imperfect competition and corporate power"). Paying executives greater than their
marginal productivity, therefore, is inefficient according to this theory.
Yet, a different economic theory, the efficiency wage theory, supports paying an
executive a wage somewhat higher than his marginal productivity. The efficiency wage
theory posits that effort is determined by the level of wages and that employers pay
employees a premium wage to ensure that employees perform to maximum levels. See
HENEMAN, supra note 3, at 39-40. According to the literature on efficiency wage theory, an
individual who is paid a higher wage than they could obtain with other companies would
work harder than if just paid what he could earn elsewhere. See Kahn & Sherer, supra note
44, at 108-S.
It is possible that the efficiency wage theory has a physiological origin. The level of
pay which will motivate employees might therefore be better determined by sociologists and
political scientists than by economists because it deals with insight into social attitudes. See
Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN. L. REV. 975, 986 (1996) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PIARIE, BEYOND INDVIDUALiSM (1995)) (suggesting that under the efficiency
wage theory employers may seek to lower the minimum wage in an effort to lower
efficiency wage level, thereby paying employees less money than they have to pay).
206. See Vroom & Deci, supra note 14, at 229.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 232. This may account for the suggestion that pay in excess of a certain level
may actually result in lower performance levels. See Clyde P. Oliver, Letters to the Editor:
CEO Pay Just Greed?, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 194. However, if so, that
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effect. First, a high level of motivation may be accompanied by a
"narrowing of the cognitive field," leading a person to ignore relevant
information to a novel or difficult task. Second, high levels of motivation
to attain a goal tend to be associated with anxiety or other strong emotional
states which may impair performance.21 °
I make this point as a reminder that guaranteeing superior executive
performance is not simply a matter of establishing the link between pay and
performance. This suggests that more work needs to be done to assess the
impact of contingent compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the empirical evidence, it is difficult to form a conclusion as
to whether contingent compensation improves motivation and thus
corporate performance. The psychological theories of motivation
considered in this article suggest that contingent compensation has the
potential to positively affect managerial performance, but that such
compensation is not now being used in a way that will maximize the
motivating effect. However, the potential does exist and changes can
indeed be made in how contingent compensation plans are structured and
implemented so as to increase their positive effect. The same is true of
Congress and its agencies, which, if they intend to act in ways to encourage
the use of contingent compensation, should consider requiring that such
compensation arrangements be structured and operated in a more effective
way.
Furthermore, although the focus in this article has been on executives,
theories of motivation certainly have implications for compensating lower
level executives and rank and file employees as well. Companies are
increasingly using contingent compensation for a wider range of
employees,"' and serious thought should be given to whether there is value
in doing so. As I suggested earlier, the motivational impact of contingent
compensation for rank and file employees will not be the same as the
212impact on executives. Still, we need to give consideration to how these
motivational theories affect our view of the use of contingent compensation
result may be the result of performance goals that are too low; for example, the problem
could be the nature of the link between pay and performance, not the absolute level of
performance.
210. See Vroom & Deci, supra note 14, at 232-33.
211. See Berss, supra note 161, at 47 ("even the lowest level employees get 13% of
compensation from long-term incentives"); Carey Gillam, Incentive Pay Plans Going
Deeper in Banks Rosters, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 1997, at 4 (reporting that incentive bonuses
are "filtering down through the ranks" in the banking industry); Tice, supra note 195 (noting
how IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and AT&T give stock options to 100% of their employees).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
MOTIVATING EXECUTIVES
213for rank and file employees.
213. It is particularly interesting to consider equity theory in this regard, given the
tremendous gap in pay between executive and rank and file employees. According to one
survey, CEOs of the largest American companies earned 209 times the pay of the average
employee. See Reingold, supra note 151, at 59 (noting that for 1997, CEO average pay rose
54% to $5,781,300, 209 times that of a factory employee, who gained a 3% raise). The gap
between the highest and lowest paid workers has been steadily rising. See Kadlec, supra
note 151, at 59 (noting that pay disparity between CEOs and rank and file employees is five
times greater than it was 30 years ago and is still growing); KEvIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS
OF RiCH AND POOR 179-80 (1991) (stating that in 1979, CEOs made 29 times the income of
the average manufacturing worker; by 1985, the multiple was 40 and in 1988 total
compensation of CEOs had increased to 93 times the earnings of the average factory
worker).
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